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ATTN:  
Marideth Sandler 
Chairperson, GSP Trade Policy Staff Committee 
Office of the United States Trade Representative 
600 17th St., NW, Room 514 
Washington, DC 20508 
 
Over a year ago, the ILRF came before this Committee to request a review to determine 
if the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) should remain eligible for 
GSP benefits because of its concerted anti-union efforts against trade unions affiliated 
with the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) conducted by the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP) and other executive branch agencies of the GRP.1 Little has changed in one year,  
and the workers for Dole Food’s companies in Mindanao are no exception. Filipino 
workers who have elected Amado Kadena, and other KMU-affiliated unions across the 
Philippines, are being denied their full rights to freedom of association and to bargain 
collectively.2 The Philippine government and Dole Philippines (Dole) are engaging in 
systematic anti-union activities in and around Dole’s private special economic zone in 
Polomolok, Mindanao where they are intimidating workers, maligning the union 
membership, and undermining the union’s ability to represent Dole’s workforce. 
 
We request that the TPSC defer granting Dole Foods additional GSP benefits until: 
 
(1) The Armed Forces of the Philippines ceases its anti-union operations at the Dole’s 
facilities in the Philippines and at other corporations across the Philippines, and 
implement the recommendations of the UN Special Rapporteur and the ILO 
Committee on Freedom of Association. (See Country Practice Petition). 
                                                 
1 See ILRF, Philippines: Country Practice Petition (ILRF GSP Petition)(filed before the TPSC on June 22, 
2007). 
2 See International Labor Organization Conventions 87 and 98. 
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(2) Dole ceases acting in concert with the Armed Forces of the Philippines by 
facilitating anti-union “symposiums” conducted by the AFP and Dole employees. 
(3) Dole drops the criminal libel charges against Mr. Oscar Serohijos and reinstates 
him to his position in the company. 
(4) The outstanding labor disputes from the last Collective Bargaining Agreement 
negotiation between the union and Dole are resolved. 
(5) Dole commits to hiring full-time workers in lieu of contract labor when expanding 
operations in the Philippines. 
 
We request that the Committee hold open its review of Dole’s petition and reconsider it 
again next year. A one year deferment on the decision will have no long-term impact on 
Dole’s operations, but will promote equitable, sustainable economic development for the 
people of Mindanao. 
 
I. The USTR has the mandate to ensure that “internationally recognized 
 workers’ rights” are being respected when deciding a product petition. 
 
Dole has requested the USTR to take action to expand product eligibility for the GSP 
program by requesting that the USTR add pineapple juice to the list of eligibly products. 
When the GSP program was amended in 1984 to include protections for internationally 
recognized workers’ rights, Congress specifically intended these standards would apply 
with respect consideration of product petitions. In particular, the USTR has the authority 
“limit the application of the duty-free treatment” accorded to a product under §2463, 
which governs the product petition process, and is instructed to “consider the factors set 
forth in §2461 and §2462(c).”3 §2462(c) instructs the Committee must consider “whether 
or not such country has taken or is taking steps to afford workers in that country 
(including in any designated zone in that country) internationally recognized workers’ 
rights.”4  
 
§2461 instructs the Committee to examine “the effect such action [ie. expanding GSP 
benefits] will have on furthering the economic development of developing countries 
through the expansion of their exports.”5 As envisioned by Congress, the purpose of the 
GSP program is to “promote the notion that trade . . . is a more effective . . . way of 
promoting broad-based sustained economic development.”6 Internationally recognized 
workers rights, particularly the right to form unions and bargain collectively to achieve 
higher wages and better working conditions, is “essential for workers in developing 
countries to attain decent living standards and to overcome hunger and poverty” and  “an 
important means of ensuring that the broadest sectors of the population . . . benefit from 
the GSP program.” 7 Therefore, internationally recognized workers’ rights are a core 
consideration when determining the impact of GSP benefits on economic development. 
 
                                                 
3 See 19 USC §2463(c)(1) 
4 See 19 USC §§2463(c)(1), 2462(c)(7). 
5 See 19 USC §2461(1). 
6 See General Systems of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, P.L. 98-573, 98 Stat. 3019 
7 See House Report No. 98-1090, 1984 U.S.S.C.A.N. at 5111. 
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II.  The GRP is implementing authoritarian measures against workers and 
lawyers affiliated with the AK-NAFLU-KMU to deprive them of their right 
to freedom of association. 
 
The GRP and Dole testified that granting GSP benefits to Dole would promote their 
vision of economic development. As we noted in our Philippines Country Petition, 
though, these economic development policies include authoritarian, and at times 
draconian, anti-union measures where union leaders and organizers are killed, abducted, 
tortured, harassed, arrested, and placed under surveillance, often at the height of labor 
disputes stemming from CBA negotiations or organizing campaigns.8 The GRP justifies 
its authoritarian actions by arguing that the KMU and other civil society organizations are 
terrorist organizations whose members are seeking to overthrow the government.9  
 
The GRP supports its allegation by asserting that the KMU’s former Secretary General 
Crispin Beltran, who was also a former Philippine Congressman for the Anakpawis party 
until his death earlier this year, was a member of the NPA.10  The Government had 
charged Rep. Beltran with rebellion in 2006.11 However, the Philippine Supreme Court 
dismissed the charges and accused the government of abusing the legal system to achieve 
political goals.12 
 
The government also argues that the KMU is a terrorist organization because its mission 
is to hinder the growth of the economy or engage in actions otherwise adversely affecting 
the economy. 13 Major Medel Aguilar of the AFP’s 5th Civil Relations Group, who is 
assigned to the Dole facilities, describes his mission as protecting “free enterprises as 
mandated by the president’s policy of foreign investment and resource development” 
from KMU-affiliated unions, who he argues is trying to bring down the entire Philippine 
economy.14 Maj. Aguilar justifies his actions by arguing that the KMU is trying to 
increase poverty because “if there is no poverty, the insurgency would be irrelevant.”15 
 
The KMU’s mission and legal responsibility is to zealously represent its members’ 
interests.  Like all other trade unions, workers choose to join the KMU because they want 
a brighter economic future that includes sharing more equitably in the benefits of 
economic development. Sometimes, the economic interests of Filipino workers are in 
direct conflict with the interests of corporate management, investors and the government. 
                                                 
8 See ILRF GSP Petition. 
9 See United Nations, General Assembly. Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions, Phillip Alston. November 2007. Available at www.extrajudicialexecutions.org. 
10 See ILRF, Post-hearing Brief re Philippines Country Practice Petition. (filed before the USTR on 
October 19, 2007). 
11 See ILRF GSP Petition. 
12 See Beltran v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175013, June 1, 2007 (dismissing charges of rebellion 
against Rep. Crispin Beltran brought by the GRP.) 
13 Id. See also Presidential Proclomation 1017, February 24, 2006. (“Whereas, this series of actions is 
hurting the Philippine state – by obstructing governance including hindering growth of the economy . . . 
Whereas, the actions are adversely affecting the economy.”) 
14 Brad Miller, Philippines: State Forces Shield Corporations from Leftists, Global Information Network, 
March 13, 2008. 
15 Id. 
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When this occurs, though, workers have guaranteed rights, including the freedom of 
association, the right to strike, and other internationally recognized workers’ rights, to 
help them defend themselves from the combined political and economic power of the 
state and the corporations. The right to freedom of association provides workers with a 
basic set of tools that they need to be able to fairly bargain for the economic well-being 
of their families and communities. If the KMU’s mission was to ruin the economy, then 
Filipino workers wouldn’t choose to join the KMU. 
 
 A. Dole and the Armed Forces of the Philippines have collaborated on  
  anti-union propaganda programs in Mindanao. 
 
The GRP has enlisted the aid of many corporations to undermine these rights, and to 
combat the KMU.16 Dole is no exception. According to Lt. Col. Ricardo Santiago of the 
AFP’s 27th Infantry Batallion, Dole has been “infiltrated by” the KMU, which he alleges 
is a “front” for the New Peoples’ Army.  Lt. Col. Santiago is referring to the workers’ 
democratically elected union, AK-NAFLU-KMU, or Amado Kadena. Amado Kadena is 
a member of the legally registered National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU). First 
elected by the workers in 2001, Amado Kadena was recently re-elected by full-time 
workforce at Dole by a wide margin for the third time consecutive election. 
 
In Polomolok, Mindanao, Dole and the AFP have been collaborating to operate anti-
union propaganda programs directed by Major Aguilar and the 27th Infantry Battallion.17 
On at least four different occasions, the AFP and Dole have jointly conducted, or 
coordinated, anti-union campaigns and “symposiums” during work hours alleging that 
union members are “terrorists.” 
 
  1. September 2007: AFP/Dole “Symposium” in Polomolok 
 
According to [***], who are both employees at Dole Polomolok Cannery, they were  
approached by their team leader [***], who told them to attend a four hour “Public 
Awareness Symposium” on Saturday morning, September 8, 2007 at the SADOK 
Restaurant in Polomolok. [***] informed [***] that Dole management had called for the 
symposium in support to the AFP’s “campaign to end terrorism.” 
 
On the day of the symposium, workers from Dole’s different departments arrived at the 
restaurant and had to register their names on two computerized bond papers. [***], the 
team leader, and another Dole employee assisted in the registration process to “ensure 
that our group attended the said activity.”18 
 
                                                 
16 See ILO. Committee on the Freedom of Association, Interim Report Case No. 2528: Complaint against 
the Government of the Philippines presented by the Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center. GB.299/4/1, June 
2007. 
17 See Affadavits of [*** taken March 2008]. Both are employees of Dole Philippines. A copy of the 
affadavits are available from AK-NAFLU-KMU. The ILRF can make a copy available for the Committee 
upon request.  
18 See [***] affidavit. 
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Maj. Medel Aguilar along with one other person in active military service and two people 
who identified themselves former union leaders from Davao, North Cotabato, presented 
lectures and showed a video where they repeatedly pronounced that the AK-NAFLU-
KMU were communist rebels. The AFP stated, “If you support KMU, the result will be 
destruction, trouble and rebellion, if you support management, the result will be 
prosperity.” 
 
Maj. Aguilar, though, has made it absolutely clear during that meeting that the AFP is 
accusing every Amado Kadena member of being a member of the New People’s Army 
because of their affiliation. When one of Dole’s employees asked Maj. Aguilar “why 
don’t you arrest them (referring to the Amado Kadena union officers) instead of assailing 
them that they are NPA’s?”, Major Aguilar responded that they cannot arrest them 
because they don’t carry firearms, or apparently have any other evidence to back their 
allegations.19 Workers reported to the union that they were intimidated and afraid after 
facing these accusations in a closed door meeting run by the AFP.20 
 
  2. January 2008: AFP/Dole “Symposium” in Polomolok 
 
This past January, [***], was told by his superintendent at work, [***], to attend a similar 
Public Awareness Symposium at the Barangay Hall, Barangay Cannery, Polomolok 
South Cotabato. 
 
On the day of the symposium, when [***] work gang came to work, [****] informed 
them that their work gang would not be working that day. [***] then instructed him and 
at least four other gang members that if they wanted to get paid for that day’s work, “it is 
better to attend to the symposium.”21  Just like the September “symposium”, the 
participants, who came from Dole’s different departments, were required to register and 
were assisted by Dole employees. 
 
The “symposium” was directed by three active members of the AFP who were armed 
with .45 caliber pistols on their waist, and the employees had to watch a video 
presentation that accused the Amado Kadena union of being communists and rebels. One 
of the resource person added in his talk that the “Kanang unyon NPA, trabahante mo, 
pero NPA pud mo.” [translation: The union is NPA. You're the worker, but you are also 
an NPA.] 
  
The speaker accused the KMU of seeking to destabilize companies, and told the 
employees “kung unsay mando sa management sundon kay diri man ta nagakuha ug 
pamugas.” [translation: Whatever the management commands, follow it because this is 
where we get our rice from.] 
 
  3. February 2008: AFP/Dole “Symposium” in Polomolok 
 
                                                 
19 See [***] affidavit. 
20 See [***] affidavit. 
21 See Affidavit of [***] taken March 2008. [***] is an employee at Dole. 
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On, February 23, 2008, Dole and the AFP conducted another symposium. According to 
[****],22  Dole had scheduled a company seminar for that Saturday. When [****] arrived 
are required for the company seminar, his superior notified the employees that the 
company seminar was cancelled and  he was ordered by his team leader, [***], to attend 
an AFP Public Awareness Symposium at the Barangay Hall in Barangay Cannery, 
Polomolok South Cotabato.  
 
When [***] arrived at the Barangay Hall with Dole employees from different 
departments, Dole administrative employees helped him register his name on an 
unmarked piece of paper. Then, the workers were introduced to two members of the 
AFP’s 27th IB who showed the workers a video that repeatedly pronounced that Amado 
Kadena were communist rebels and that the KMU is a “training ground for the NPA.”23 
 
The AFP’s lecture also included allegations that the union was misappropriating union 
dues, or Estafa, implying that the dues are being used to fund the NPA. The AFP also 
accused the AK-NAFLU-KMU of storing guns at the back of its union office. The lecture 
then concluded by declare that “the AK is an NPA, therefore the workers also are NPA”. 
 
 4.  October 2007: AFP Operations around Dole-Stanfilco and  
   Davao Integrated Transport. 
 
Current military operations at the Polomolok facility are not unique. Already, Major 
Aguilar and the 27th IB are directing anti-union efforts aimed at a different KMU affiliate 
that was negotiating a CBA with another Dole subsidiary in Mindanao. On October 9, 
2007, the KMU-affiliated workers were in the middle of CBA negotiations with Dole’s 
subsidiary companies, Davao Integrated Transport Facilities, Inc (DITFI), when the 
company suddenly shut its operations and the jobs were contracted out.  
 
Throughout the CBA negotiation process, the 27th IB had been deployed to the 
company’s premises to monitor union activity and the movement of the union’s leaders. 
The union representing DITFI workers had been complaining that “[the military] have 
been doing the rounds … in Panabo and Davao, going house to house and to other 
companies, warning workers against [NAMADITFI] and KMU. They call [NAMADITFI 
and KMU union workers] communists, recruiters for the New People’s Army, and tail 
[NAMADITFI and KMU union workers] to and from work.” When the company 
suddenly shut its doors, Maj. Aguilar was the first to publicly accuse the KMU of being 
responsible for the “termination of the contract between Dole-Stanfilco and its trucking 
and hauling service provider DITFI [a subsidiary of Dole-Stanfilco] which has left about 
270 employees out of work.”24 
 
 B. The GRP has arrested Remigio Saladero, attorney for Amado-
 Kadena. 
                                                 
22 See Affidavit of [****] taken March 2008. 
23 Id. 
24 See ILRF, Post-hearing Brief re Philippines Country Practice Petition. (filed before the USTR on 
October 19, 2007). 
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On October 23, 2008, just four days after the ILRF presented testimony before this 
Committee describing a Philippine military campaign against the KMU-affiliates at Dole, 
the GRP arrested Attorney Remigio Saladero, who is an attorney for Amado Kadena, on 
two-year old murder charges. According the Human Rights Watch, 
  
 Philippine police arrested Saladero on October 23, 2008, at his law office in 
 Antipolo City, in Rizal province, his attorney said. The police showed a 2006 
 arrest warrant for a case of multiple murder and attempted murder in Oriental 
 Mindoro province that bore the name – Remegio Saladero alias Ka Patrick – and a 
 different address. They also confiscated Saladero’s computer hard drive, laptop 
 and mobile phone.25  
 
After his arrest, Atty. Saladero was interrogated for six hours outside the presence of his 
legal counsel in contravention of his legal rights. 
 
Atty. Saladero is the board chairman of the Pro-Labor Legal Assistance Center (PLACE) 
and chief legal counsel for the KMU. PLACE and Atty. Saladero represent workers at 
Hacienda Luisita, Nestle Philippines, Chong Won, Dole Philippines, International Wiring 
Systems, and Solidarity of Cavite Workers union, whose union leaders have been 
murdered or subject to government harassments, either by the military or private security 
forces.26 
 
  1. Atty. Saladero’s arrest appears to be politically motivated. 
 
Atty. Saladero’s arrest has raised serious concerns among human rights and lawyers 
groups. Human Rights Watch stated that the charges against Atty. Saladero appear to be 
politically motivated, stating: 
  
 “Suddenly arresting a well-established activist lawyer for a two-year-old multiple 
 murder case in another province should set off alarm bells. This smacks of 
 harassment, pure and simple.”27  
 
The Philippine Supreme Court, UN Special Rapporteur, Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch, and many other organizations are raising concerns that the GRP is 
pursuing abusive prosecutions in its campaign against Anakpawis, the KMU, and other 
alleged “front” organizations.28 The Supreme Court of the Philippines openly questioned 
                                                 
25 See Human Rights Watch, Philippines: Free Labor Rights Lawyer, Continuing harassment of leftist 
activists. October 29, 2008. (HRW Report). Available at www.hrw.org. 
26 For a full discussion of these cases, please see ILRF Country Practice Petition on the Philippines. 
27 See HRW Report. 
28United Nations. Press Release. UN Special Rapporteur Calls for Changes to the Philippines’ Human 
Security Act., 12 March 2007. Available at www.unhchr.ch. See also Coronel, “The Philippines in 2006,” 
176; AI, Report 2007 (London: AI, 2007), http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/Regions/Asia-
Pacific/Philippines;  
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the partisan political motives of the Secretary of Justice and the federal prosecutors in 
arresting and charging Rep. Crispin Beltran, representative of the Anakpawis party-list 
and former Secretary General of the KMU, with rebellion. In Beltran v. People of the 
Philippines, G.R. No. 175013, June 1, 2007, the court chastised the Secretary of Justice 
and the federal prosecutors for the “obvious involvement of political considerations in the 
actuations of respondent Secretary of Justice and respondent prosecutors.”29 The Court 
felt the need to send a warning to the GRP that:  
 
 [P]rosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their 
 noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political 
 ends, or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental 
 objective of observing the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor 
 to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or 
 mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established procedure may be public’s 
 perception of the impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced.30 
 
In a different case, the Philippine Supreme Court warned the GRP that its counter-
insurgency policies will lead to abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military 
against KMU.31 
 
  2. The GRP has been harassing Atty. Saladero and his colleagues  
   at PLACE for the past two years. 
 
Atty. Saladero arrest is an escalation of the GRP’s recent efforts to curtail his ability to 
represent his clients and practice law, leaving his clients without adequate legal 
representation. 
 
On October 5, 2006, in the midst of the strikes at Chong Won and Nestle Philippines, the 
AFP placed Atty. Saladero and his colleagues at PLACE under surveillance. A few days 
later, PLACE attorneys observed “suspicious-looking men” near their offices PLACE.  
Feeling threatened by the AFP surveillance, PLACE staff members had to vacate their 
offices for several weeks, and missed several hearings as a result of their well-founded 
fears of persecution. PLACE filed a compliant with the Commission on Human Rights 
seeking help. However, when the Commission scheduled a hearing on December 19, 
2006, the AFP refused to file an answer and did not participate in the hearing.  The AFP 
has not yet agreed to participate in a hearing. 
 
In October 2007, PLACE staff observed that their offices were again under 24 hour 
surveillance by unidentified men. Atty. Saladero was serving as legal counsel for the 
KMU and the Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR) in their legal efforts 
                                                                                                                                                 
American Bar Association (ABA) Asia Law Initiative, Judicial Reform Index for the Philippines 
(Washington, DC: ABA, March 2006), 23, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/rol/publications/philippines_jri_2006.pdf.. 
29 See Beltran v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175013, June 1, 2007. (dismissing charges of rebellion 
against Rep. Crispin Beltran brought by the GRP.) 
30 Id. 
31 See Prof. Randolf David, et. al. vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006.   
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questioning the constitutionality of the recently enacted the Human Security Act of 2007. 
He and his colleagues are also responsible for filing the KMU’s complaint to the ILO 
Committee on Freedom of Association and requesting an ILO high-level mission to the 
Philippines to investigate the killings, disappearances, and military harassment of KMU 
members. 
 
In August 2008, the Philippine prosecutor’s office named Atty. Saladero a "person of 
interest" in the burning of a cell tower allegedly by the New Peoples Army (NPA). In 
September 2008, the GRP charged him with conspiracy to commit rebellion for allegedly 
participating in the arson. Saladero was charged along with 26 other civil society leaders 
representing legal organizations in Southern Tagalog. 
 
 C. GRP and Dole have worked together to weaken Amado-Kadena while 
 Dole management and the union were negotiating a new CBA. 
 
To protect Dole’s interests from the alleged “terrorist” activities of the workers’ 
democratically elected union, the GRP has utilized all the tools it has at its disposal to 
combat Amado-Kadena and weaken the workers’ at Dole by undercutting their ability to 
bargain for better wages and benefits from Dole. 
 
In March 2006, the Dole’s workers overwhelmingly elected Amado Kadena for the 
second consecutive election to negotiate a CBA with Dole. In April 2006, the union 
began negotiating with Dole management.  In July 2006, as discussed the ILRF’s Pre-
hearing Brief, Dole charged union secretary [***] with criminal libel for statements he 
made at a union rally about Dole’s pollution.32  
 
In August 2006, after the negotiations between Management and the union had broken 
down, 96% of Dole workers voted in favor of filing a notice of strike with the 
Department of Labor and Employment.33 The Secretary of Labor then assumed 
jurisdiction over the labor dispute by designating Dole as an industry “vital to the 
national interest.”34 Because the government assumed jurisdiction, Dole workers were 
prohibited from going on strike and ordered to remain at work. As a result, the Philippine 
government deprived the workers of what little bargaining power they had left to 
negotiate for better pay and benefits from Dole. 
 
Into early 2007, Dole management and the union continued negotiating. Because the 
negotiations had been drawn out for over six months, the union negotiators eventually ran 
out of company leave time. The negotiators requested that Dole advance them additional 
                                                 
32 See ILRF Pre-hearing Brief re. Dole Foods Petition. 
33  See Memorandum, From Wilfrido P. Santos who is Conciliator-Mediator for the National Conciliation 
and Mediation Board to Hon. Reynaldo R. Ubaldo, Executive Director of IV for the Department of Labor 
and Employment sent on July 26, 2008. (NCMB Decision). 
34 See ILRF GSP Petition for a full discussion of assumption of jurisdiction. The GRP employs standards 
for assuming jurisdiction that are in violation of internationally recognized workers’ rights, as determined 
by the ILO.  The Secretary of Labor employs an extremely broad definition of industries it deems 
“indispensible to the national interest,” designating industries outside the “essential services” as vital to the 
growth of the economy. 
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union leave time to so that they could complete the negotiations, but Dole refused telling 
the workers to use their vacation leave instead. When the union negotiators protested and 
continued to attend the negotiating sessions with management, Dole charged 21 members 
of the negotiating panel with being absent without leave from their full-time position with 
the company, and fired two of the union officers.35 The rest were suspended from their 
job. 
 
The union filed for preventative mediation with a conciliator-mediator to protest the 
unfair labor practice of firing two of the negotiators. However, management has opted to 
send only personnel who are unauthorized to settle the outstanding disputes. In July 2008, 
the conciliator-mediator noted in a memo to the Regional Department of Labor and 
Employment:36  
 
 “Middle management is blocking all information coming from the union and they 
 don’t give the right information to Mr. Kevin Davis. 
 
 Mr. Robert Buranday [a company official] and company are using workers who 
 are against the union to file cases against the union president before the local 
 court for Estafa, and using management resources to produce the leaflets. 
 
 Mr. Robert Buranday and company refused to follow the agreed procedure on 
 grievance under the CBA. 
 
 Mr. Robert Buranday and company are using the military and community to 
 harass  the union.” 
 
On October 8, 2007, after over 1 ½ years of negotiation, and in the face of AFP anti-
union “symposiums”, charges of criminal libel and corruption, the firing of several union 
leaders, and the use of anti-union leaflets at the workplace, Amado Kadena agreed to a 5-
year CBA with Dole on condition that the economic provisions of the CBA will be 
renegotiated in February 2009. The Union has submitted it current proposal for the 
renegotiation to Dole management, and are waiting for the negotiations to begin this 
November. 
 
 III.  Conclusion 
 
Trade unions are important partners in achieving long-term, equitable development. 
Strong, democratic labor organizations are vital for promoting democratic change; 
improving labor laws, relations, policies and practices; expanding the social dialogue to 
encourage basic protections from the government; promoting sustainable development; 
and, of primary importance in the Philippine context, promoting good governance and 
combating corruption. 
 
                                                 
35 See NCMB Decision. 
36 Id. 
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From an economic perspective, there is a strong correlation between the protection of 
core labor standards, including the right to freedom of association, and strong economic 
growth.37 Strong labor organizations play a key role in ensuring that the gains from 
global trade are shared across a broad spectrum of society, which promotes expansion of 
domestic markets and sustained economic development. Also, strong labor organizations 
play a key role in increasing domestic savings and investment and lessening the reliance 
on outside capital and keeping capital gains within a country. 
 
Recognizing the vital role that labor unions play in ensuring long-term, sustainable, and 
equitable development, and the GSP’s program’s emphasis on protecting workers’ rights, 
the ILRF requests that the Committee defer a decision on Dole’s petition for one year in 
order to ensure that workers’ rights are being protected at Dole’s operations in Mindanao 
and that the GRP’s ends the anti-union campaign currently being conducted by the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines. 
 
RESPONSE TO HEARING QUESTIONS 
PHILIPPINES: ADD PINEAPPLE JUICE – NOT CONCENTRATED 
 
During the hearing, you mentioned some type of certification that is renewed yearly 
through audits.  Could you elaborate on what is actually being certified and what 
the certification process entails? 
 
The ILRF does not know if SA 8000 has been made aware of the anti-union campaign 
jointly operated by the Dole and the AFP that is currently underway. We will be raising 
this matter with SAI directly, and will update the Committee as to any actions taken by 
SAI. We know that SAI’s auditor did not meet with the non-management representative, 
who is Mr. Jose Teruel, the president of the union, during the last audit because Mr. 
Teruel was engaged in contentious contract negotiations with management. Because SAI 
auditors failed to meet with Mr. Teruel, SAI found Dole to be in “minor non-compliance” 
with SAI standards. We are not aware of why SAI auditors were unable to meet with Mr. 
Teruel, and SAI did not described the efforts it undertook to meet with Mr. Teruel, as is 
the auditor’s responsibility. Sadly, Dole management was quick to blame Mr. Teruel, 
though, stating in a letter that it was Mr. Teruel’s responsibility to take “appropriate 
corrective measures (ie. meet with arrange a meeting with SAI.)”  
 
Since Dole’s position defending its labor rights practices rests solely on the auditing done 
by one SAI contractor, we request that Dole be required to submit a copy of the full 
results of its SA 8000 audit for public filing at the USTR so that all parties can assess the 
scope of the audit. Also, we request a full explanation as to the rights and responsibilities 
                                                 
37 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (1996) Trade, Employment and Labour 
Standards: A Study of Core Workers Rights and International Trade. Paris: OECD. See also, Kucera, 
David. (2001) The Effects of Core Workers Rights on Labour Costs and Foreign Direct Investment: 
Evaluating the "Conventional Wisdom". Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies.; Dølvik, Jon 
Erik and Liv Tørres. (2002) Globalisation, Work, and Labour Standards. Oslo: Fafo Institute for Applied 
Social Science.  
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of the union when SAI is conducting an audit, and why SAI was unable to meet with 
union officials. 
 
Brian Campbell (ILRF) 
 
1. Can you describe the Comprehensive Agriculture Reform Program (CARP) 
in greater detail, specifically touching on how, as discussed in your 
submission, those who received land were legally prevented from controlling 
it, how they were obliged to form labor cooperatives and how those 
cooperatives were controlled by rich landlords? 
 
As noted in our oral testimony, the ILRF is not an expert on the myriad programs 
available under CARP. Though our comments discussed certain aspects of CARP that we 
believe will not promote broad-based, sustainable development, our primary concern in 
regards to extending benefits to Dole stem from the anti-union efforts currently underway 
at Dole’s facilities as described in our submissions to the Committee. 
 
At this time, we are unable to synthesize the voluminous data available on the 
implementation of CARP and on the use of agricultural contracts by multinational 
corporations to expand production in Mindanao. Our efforts preparing our Post-hearing 
brief and the responses to the Committee questions were interrupted by the arrest of the 
union’s attorney, Remigio Saladero, as discussed above. We request that the committee 
provide the ILRF more time to prepare a more full response to the questions regarding 
CARP and the development of agricultural and labor cooperatives.   
 
In the meantime, please find below a list of invaluable resources that describe in detail 
CARP, cooperative development, contract farming, and the prominent role multi-national 
corporations such as Dole have played in expanding agricultural production in Mindanao. 
 
Ballesteros, Marife and Felino Cortez. (2008). CARP Institutional Assessment in a Post-
 2008 Transition Scenario: Implications for Land Administration and 
Management.  Discussion Paper Series No. 2008-07. Philippine Institute for 
Development  Studies. 
 
Bello, Walden, Herbert Docena, Marissa De Guzman, Mary Lou Malig. (2006). The 
 Political Economy of Permanent Crisis in the Philippines. Chapter 2: Agrarian 
 Reform: The Promise and the Reality. ZED Books.  
 
Borras, Saturnino and Jennifer Franco. (2005) Struggles for Land and Livlihood: 
 Redistributive  Reform in Agribusiness Plantations in the Philippines. Critical 
 Asian Studies, 37:3, pp. 331 – 361.  
 
Borras, Saturnino. (2005) Can Redistributive Reform Be Achieved via Market-Based 
 Voluntary Land Transfer Schemes? Evidence and Lessons from the Philippines. 
 Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 90 – 134. 
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Borras, Saturnino. (2008). Foreign Aid and CARP Extension. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 5 
 July 2008. 
 
Digal, Larry. (2007). Agricultural Contracts in Mindanao: the Case of Bananas and 
 Pineapple. Philippine Institute for Development Studies. Discussion Paper Series 
 No. 2007-24. 
 
Flores-Obanil, Carmina B. and Mary Ann Manahan. Leaseback Arrangements: Reversing 
 Agrarian Reform Gains in the Philippines. LRAN (8 Feb. 2007) 4 
 
Fuwa, Nobuhiko, Politics and Economics of Land Reform in the Philippines: A Survey. 
 Background paper prepared for a World Bank Study, Dynamism of Rural Sector 
 Growth: Policy Lessons from East Asian Countries. May 2000. 
 
Ofreneo, Rene E., The Leaseback Mode of Agrarian Reform: Strenghts, Weaknesses,and 
 Options. September 2000. 
 
Vellema, Sietze. (1999). Agribusiness Control in Phillipine Farm Contracting: From 
 Formality to Intervention. Wageningen University. International Journal of 
 Sociology of Agriculture and Food 8: 95. 
 
At this time, CARP has not yet been extended. Several proposals are under review in the 
Philippines House of Representatives. 
 
 
2. Your brief mentions a 2006 Filipino Supreme Court ruling on Dole 
Philippines’ use of contract labor.  Can you elaborate on this ruling, 
including how it was reached and the group of people you believe it was 
meant to affect? 
 
In November 2006, the Supreme Court ruled in Dole Philippines, Inc. v. Medel Esteva, 
G.R. No. 161115, (Phil. S. Ct. 2006) that the CAMPCO, which is the Cannery Multi-
Purpose Cooperative, was a labor-only contacting cooperative. As a result, the court ruled 
that the members of CAMPCO members must be treated as full-time employees of Dole, 
which would mean that they could join the union. 
 
The full impact of this ruling is not yet known since it is not clear whether Dole or 
CAMPCO have abided by the courts order. The court ordered Dole to immediately rehire 
the worker/plaintiffs as full time employees and assign them to their former position 
without loss of seniority rights and other benefits and to pay over 10 years of back wages. 
 
The importance of this ruling cannot be understated, though. Dole acquires labor for its 
plantation and processing facilities in four different ways. 
 
1. Full-time employment: These employees are hired full-time to work harvesting 
pineapples on Dole’s leased land, and also work in Dole’s processing facilities. There 
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workers are members of the union, Amado Kadena, and their salary and benefits are 
determined through a collective contract negotiation between the union and Dole. As 
Dole has noted, full-time employees are able to bargain for their wages, and, as a result, 
receive higher compensation for the same work than contract workers. Currently, there 
are nearly 5000, full-time employees. 
 
2. Labor cooperatives, which are similar to employment agencies in the US, 
currently supply Dole with 8,000 workers who engage in the same work as the full-time 
employees. Dole pays the cooperatives directly in exchange for personnel while officers 
from the cooperatives pay the workers or “members”.  Cooperatives deduct a portion of 
monthly wages (PhP 100) from their member workers for capital build up.  Cooperative 
members are paid according to the pakyawan production quota system and are not paid 
for any overtime work. Because cooperative workers are not full-time employees, they 
are not allowed to unionize, negotiate a collective contract, or receive the benefits of a 
collective contract. 
 
3. Dole also hires 6,000 contract laborers. These workers perform duties similar to 
the workers from the labor cooperatives and the full-time employees. The difference is 
that Dole directly hires these workers and categorizes them as casual workers, 
apprentices, trainees, part-timers and relievers in order to allow the company to adjust its 
labor supply according to its production demands. These workers are also paid under the 
pakyawan quota system and are denied the right to unionize. 
 
4. Dole hires 1,000 project employees for specific tasks or projects. These workers 
are essentially contract laborers as described above. In its testimony before the 
Committee, Dole testified that they would hire 2000 more contract workers as a result of 
the expanded GSP benefits, and opined that expanded advertising and marketing may 
allow them to offer some of these contract workers full-time positions. 
 
After the Esteva decision, Dole is on notice and is required to cease using labor from 
labor-only cooperatives such as CAMPCO, Adventurers’s Multi-purpose Cooperative, 
Human Resource Multi-purpose Cooperative, and others. Workers from the multi-
purpose cooperatives must be retained as full-time workers and be eligible for union 
membersip. 
 
Its important to note, here, that CAMPCO management sided with Dole in the litigation 
because its business model of contracting out labor, though deemed illegal, has been 
highly profitable for many members of the cooperative at the expense of many workers.  
 
For a detailed discussion of labor contracting, please see Dole Philippines, Inc. v. Medel 
Esteva, G.R. No. 161115, Philippine Supreme Court, November 30, 2006 which we have 
appended at the end of the questions.  
 
3. Your petition portrays a troubling picture of Dole’s labor practices in the 
Philippines.  What are your sources for these allegations?  And what steps 
would Dole Packaged Foods need to take in order to address these concerns?   
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ILRF partners conducted field research in the provinces of Sultan Kudarat, South 
Cotabato and Saranggani between June 2006 and June 2007. Primary data-gathering 
included surveys, interviews, and focus group discussions with key informants such as 
union leaders, company officers, community leaders, government officials, plantation 
growers, land owners, and children.  91 individuals were interviewed. We supplemented 
our field research with an extensive literature review. 
 
4. What role does ILRF see for the Government of the Republic of the 
Philippines to correct the problems it notes in its public comment regarding 
Dole Packaged Foods LLC? 
 
Please refer to our recommendations in our Post-hearing Brief at pg. 1. 
 
5. How are Cooperatives organized and how do they decide to whom they will 
lease their land? 
a) As a follow up, can individual cooperative members choose not to 
participate in a lease and keep their holding for their own purposes? 
 
Please see Response to Question 1. 
 
6. This case is about adding Pineapple juice from all GSP beneficiaries.  Do you 
have similar concerns about labor practices of other pineapple producers in 
other GSP beneficiaries or even Del Monte’s operations elsewhere in the 
Philippines? 
 
Yes. We have similar concerns but have not yet had the opportunity to investigate other 
producers in the Philippines, Thailand or Indonesia. In our research, we have identified 
common labor problems that occur in pineapple production in the Philippines and Costa 
Rica, which leads us to believe that these same problems may occur in other parts of the 
Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia. 
 
7. Since you claim that the Government of Philippines has alleged that the trade 
unions are “fronts” for terrorist organizations, can you provide any 
information to refute those allegations? 
 
Please see our Post-hearing Brief at pg. 3 – 4, supra, for a full discussion. 
 
The GRP has been intentionally blurring the lines between one illegal organization 
currently engaged in an insurgency and legitimate, legal organizations comprised of and 
supported by millions Filipino industrial workers, farmers, and religious congregations.  
 
One way the GRP blurs the lines between legal organizations and illegal insurgents is by 
using the “New Peoples Army” and the “Communist Party of the Philippines” 
interchangeably when referring to armed insurgents. The New Peoples Army is a 
designated terrorist organization that has been engaged in a 40 year insurgency. The 
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Communist Party of the Philippines is a legal political in the Philippines, and Filipinos 
can freely join the CPP if they wish, and that right is protected by law. 
 
8. Your brief summarizes what the ILRF sees as Dole’s failure to provide 
internationally recognized worker rights to its Filipino employees.  From a 
legal perspective, why should the Trade Policy Staff Committee consider the 
information in your brief with regard to Dole’s petition, when worker rights 
are not specifically mentioned as a consideration for product additions under 
GSP? 
 
Internationally recognized workers’ rights are specifically mentioned as a consideration 
for product additions under the GSP. Please see our Post-hearing brief, Section I, at pg. 2. 
 
9. Can you provide the subcommittee with all the publications (or websites 
through which they can be reached) you list in the footnotes of your brief? 
 
Due to the amount of documents cited in our briefs, and our limited resources, we can 
forward a hard copy of any documents that are not available by internet upon request by 
the Committee. For those available by internet, we have included full internet cites in the 
footnotes so that they may be easily retrieved. 
 
10. Why is the use of contract workers by Dole not a right held by the company? 
 
Labor contracting is not a right held by corporations, but rather is a privilege should the 
Philippine Secretary of Labor wish to provide it to them. However, Philippine labor laws 
clearly envision that, even if a corporation has a right to use labor contracting, a 
corporation’s rights are subject to the rights of workers. 
 
Article 106 of the Philippine Labor Code states: 
 
 The Secretary of Labor may, by appropriate regulations, restrict or prohibit the 
 contracting out of labor to protect the rights of workers established under this 
 Code. In so prohibiting or restricting, he may make appropriate distinctions 
 between labor-only contracting and job contracting as well as differentiations 
 within these types of contracting  . . . 
 
 There is labor-only contracting where the person supplying workers to an 
 employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the forms of tools, 
 equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers recruited 
 and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to 
 the principal business of the employer. In such cases, the person or the 
 intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be 
 responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were 
 directly employed by him. 
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The GSP Committee is instructed to examine the impact of extending GSP to the 
economic development in our partner countries. The use of contract workers by Dole is 
an issue related to the economic development of Mindanao. For the purposes of this 
petition, the ILRF is also arguing that Dole’s practice of using contract labor will not lead 
to long-term, sustainable, and equitable economic development, which is a factor to be 
considered under the GSP statute. 
 
Dole is evading its employer responsibilities to its contract workers and should not have 
be replacing regular workers with unregulated contract labor. Dole has systematically 
shed over half of its regular workers by coercing employees into “voluntary resignation” 
and has thus, shed its legal responsibilities to its regular workers. 77% of workers that 
contribute to Dole Philippines’ pineapple operations no longer have the basic rights to 
unionize and receive social benefits under the law. Dole’s labor practices have 
strategically undermined the rights of its regular workers and its contract workers alike to 
enjoy the freedom of association. 
 
Further, as noted by the Philippine Institute for Development Studies, while agricultural 
contracting by Dole and other agribusiness in Mindanao may lead to some overall 
economic efficiencies, “there are a number of fundamental issues that arise from this 
scheme. These are the issues of equity and sustainability.” See Digal, Larry. Agricultural 
Contracts in Mindanao: The Case of Banana and Pineapple. Philippine Institute of 
Development Studies, Discussion Paper Series No. 2007-24. (December 2007), pg. 1.   
 
11. Given the apparent cost advantage involved in hiring contract workers, why 
in your opinion does a third of Dole Philippines’ staff consist of regular 
workers?   
 
In the past, Dole hired many workers directly. These workers were able to form a union 
to protect their employment status as full-time workers. Recently, Dole has been moving 
away from hiring full time workers. Without a union, it is not clear whether Dole would 
even employ regular, full-time employees. 
 
12. Are lease payments to individual cooperative members dependent upon the 
amount of land they possess or on other factors as well? 
 
Please see response to Question 1. 
 
13. During the hearing, you mentioned both large landholders and multinational 
corporations; are the two one and the same for the purposes of your petition? 
 
No. Our comments concerning Dole’s petition are intended to cover a broad range of 
business practices employed by Dole to produce its pineapples. Some of these practices 
include large landholders who are not Dole, but work closely with Dole.  
 
14. During the hearing, you mentioned the DARBCI as a cooperative that was 
forced to lease back its land to Dole after the CARP went into effect.  Were 
PUBLIC VERSION 
18 
PUBLIC VERSION 
any other cooperatives forced to lease back their land to Dole, under the 
CARP and if so, why have they not solicited the ILRF’s assistance as the 
DARBCI apparently did? 
 
The ILRF does not represent DARBCI, and we do not claim to speak on behalf of the 
entire membership of DARBCI. DARBCI is an extremely factional organization. For 
more, please see Ofreneo, Rene E., The Leaseback Mode of Agrarian Reform: Strengths, 
Weaknesses, and Options. September 2000. 
 
15. Why were only certain cooperatives forced to lease back their land to Dole as 
part of CARP implementation in 1988? 
 
Please see our Response to Question 1. 
 
16. During the hearing, you mentioned that a wide range of social groups (labor, 
religious, others) are charged by the Government of the Philippines with 
being fronts for terrorist organizations.  Are labor groups in particular being 
singled out with respect to such allegations?  
 
Yes. Please see the ILRF’s Philippines: Country Practice Petition, filed before the TPSC 
on June 22, 2007. 
 
17. Your brief mentions a pending libel case against a Mr. Serohijos; are you 
aware of any other such pending libel cases brought by Dole against union 
leaders in the Philippines? 
 
No.  
 
18. During the hearing, you mentioned illegal labor cooperatives, but did not 
elaborate.  This point was unclear; could you please discuss it further? 
 
Please see our response to Question 2. 
 
19. How exactly do elites come to control cooperatives?  Is control a function of 
being the largest landholder within a cooperative or is there more to it than 
that? 
 
Please see our response to Question 1. 
 
20. During the hearing, independent growers and cooperatives were mentioned 
numerous times.  Is the main difference between these two groups that 
independent growers own their land outright and were likely unaffected by 
the CARP, while cooperatives are groups of peasants that received land 
through the CARP, but were forced to use that land as a group? 
a. If this is incorrect, please clarify. 
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The ILRF does not understand Dole’s or the GRP’s definition of independent farmers, 
and we are unclear whether those “independent farmers” also use hired contract labor in 
order to meet the needs of Dole. 
 
According to the academic literature available, Dole is a vertically integrated company. 
Even when it contracts with “independent farms”, it maintains tight control over the 
process for growing, and, at times, the management of labor, which makes the farmers’ 
independence in name only. For a good discussion of Dole’s vertically integrated supply 
chain, please see:  
 
Digal, Larry. (2007). Agricultural Contracts in Mindanao: the Case of Banana and 
 Pineapple. Philippine Institute for Development Studies. Discussion Paper Series 
 No. 2007-24. 
 
Vellema, Sietze. (1999). Agribusiness Control in Philippine Farm Contracting: From 
 Formality to Intervention. Wageningen University. International Journal of 
 Sociology of Agriculture and Food 8: 95. 
 
 
PUBLIC VERSION 
20 
PUBLIC VERSION 
FIRST DIVISION  
 
[G.R. No. 161115, November 30, 2006]  
 
DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. MEDEL ESTEVA, HENRY SILVA, GILBERT 
CABILAO, LORENZO GAQUIT, DANIEL PABLO, EDWIN CAMILO, BENJAMIN SAKILAN, 
RICHARD PENUELA, ARMANDO PORRAS, EDUARDO FALDAS, NILO DONDOYANO, 
MIGUEL DIAZ, ROMEL BAJO, ARTEMIO TENERIFE, EDDIE LINAO, JERRY LIGTAS, 
SAMUEL RAVAL, WILFREDO BLANDO, LORENZO MONTERO, JR., JAIME TESIPAO, 
GEORGE DERAL, ERNESTO ISRAEL, JR., AGAPITO ESTOLOGA, JOVITO DAGUIO, 
ARSENIO LEONCIO, MARLON BLANDO, JOSE OTELO CASPILLO, ARNOLD LIZADA, 
JERRY DEYPALUBOS, STEVEN MADULA, ROGELIO CABULAO, JR., ALVIN COMPOC, 
EUGENIO BRITANA, RONNIE GUELOS, EMMANUEL JIMENA, GERMAN JAVA, JESUS 
MEJICA, JOEL INVENTADO, DOMINGO JABULGO, RAMIL ENAD, RAYMUNDO YAMON, 
RITCHIE MELENDRES, JACQUEL ORGE, RAMON BARCELONA, ERWIN ESPIA, NESTOR 
DELIDELI, JR., ALLAN GANE, ROMEO PORRAS, RITCHIE BOCOG, JOSELITO ACEBES, 
DANNY TORRES, JIMMY NAVARRO, RALPH PEREZ, SONNY SESE, RONALD RODRIQUES,
ROBERTO ALLANEC, ERNIE GIGANTANA, NELSON SAMSON, REDANTE DAVILA, EDDIE 
BUSLIG, ALLAN PINEDA, JESUS BELGERA, VICENTE LABISTE, CARMENCITA 
FELISILDA, GEORGE DERLA, RUBEN TORMON, NEIL TAJALE, ORLANDO ESPENILLA, 
RITCHEL MANEJAR, JOEL QUINTANA, ERWIN ALDE, JOEL CATALAN, ELMER TIZON, 
ALLAN ESPADA, EUGENE BRETANA, RAMIL ENAD, RENE INGALLA, STEVEN MADULLA,
RANDY REBUTAZO, NEIL BAGATILLA, ARSENIO LEONCIO, ROLANDO VILLEGAS AND 
JUSLIUS TESIPAO, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY MEDEL ESTEVA, AUTHORIZED 
REPRESENTATIVE, RESPONDENTS.  
 
D E C I S I O N  
 
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: 
 
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the revised Rules of Civil 
Procedure seeking the reversal of the Decision,[1] dated 20 May 2002, and the Amended Decision,[2] dated 
27 November 2003, both rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63405, which declared 
herein petitioner Dole Philippines, Inc. as the employer of herein respondents, Medel Esteva and 86 others; 
found petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal; and ordered petitioner to reinstate respondents to their former 
positions and to pay the latter backwages. 
 
The antecedent facts of the case are recounted as follows: 
 
Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with Philippine laws, engaged 
principally in the production and processing of pineapple for the export market.[3] Its plantation is located in
Polomolok, South Cotabato.[4] 
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Respondents are members of the Cannery Multi-Purpose Cooperative (CAMPCO). CAMPCO was 
organized in accordance with Republic Act No. 6938, otherwise known as the Cooperative Code of the 
Philippines, and duly-registered with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) on 6 January 1993.[5]
Members of CAMPCO live in communities surrounding petitioner's plantation and are relatives of 
petitioner's employees. 
 
On 17 August 1993, petitioner and CAMPCO entered into a Service Contract.[6] The Service Contract 
referred to petitioner as "the Company," while CAMPCO was "the Contractor." Relevant portions thereof 
read as follows â€“ 
1. That the amount of this contract shall be or shall not exceed TWO HUNDRED TWENTY 
THOUSAND ONLY (P220,000.00) PESOS, terms and conditions of payment shall be on a per job 
basis as specified in the attached schedule of rates; the CONTRACTOR shall perform the following 
services for the COMPANY;  
 
1.1 Assist the COMPANY in its daily operations; 
 
1.2 Perform odd jobs as may be assigned. 
 
2. That both parties shall observe the following terms and conditions as stipulated, to wit:  
 
2.1 CONTRACTOR must carry on an independent legitimate business, and must comply with all 
the pertinent laws of the government both local and national; 
 
2.2 CONTRACTOR must provide all hand tools and equipment necessary in the performance of 
their work. 
 
However, the COMPANY may allow the use of its fixed equipment as a casual facility in the 
performance of the contract; 
 
2.3 CONTRACTOR must comply with the attached scope of work, specifications, and GMP and 
safety practices of the company; 
 
2.4 CONTRACTOR must undertake the contract work under the following manner: 
a. on his own account; 
 
b. under his own responsibility; 
c. according to his manner and method, free from the control and direction of the company in 
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all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the result thereof;  
 
3. CONTRACTOR must pay the prescribed minimum wage, remit SSS/MEDICARE premiums to 
proper government agencies, and submit copies of payroll and proof of SSS/MEDICARE 
remittances to the COMPANY; 
4. This contract shall be for a specific period of Six (6) months from July 1 to December 31, 1993; x x 
x. 
Pursuant to the foregoing Service Contract, CAMPCO members rendered services to petitioner. The 
number of CAMPCO members that report for work and the type of service they performed depended on the
needs of petitioner at any given time. Although the Service Contract specifically stated that it shall only be 
for a period of six months, i.e., from 1 July to 31 December 1993, the parties had apparently extended or 
renewed the same for the succeeding years without executing another written contract. It was under these 
circumstances that respondents came to work for petitioner. 
 
Investigation by DOLE 
 
Concomitantly, the Sangguniang Bayan of Polomolok, South Cotabato, passed Resolution No. 64, on 5 
May 1993, addressed to then Secretary Ma. Nieves R. Confessor of the Department of Labor and 
Employment (DOLE), calling her attention to the worsening working conditions of the petitioner's workers 
and the organization of contractual workers into several cooperatives to replace the individual labor-only 
contractors that used to supply workers to the petitioner. Acting on the said Resolution, the DOLE Regional
Office No. XI in Davao City organized a Task Force that conducted an investigation into the alleged labor-
only contracting activities of the cooperatives in Polomolok.[7] 
 
On 24 May 1993, the Senior Legal Officer of petitioner wrote a letter addressed to Director Henry M. Parel 
of DOLE Regional Office No. XI, supposedly to correct the misinformation that petitioner was involved in 
labor-only contracting, whether with a cooperative or any private contractor. He further stated in the letter 
that petitioner was not hiring cooperative members to replace the regular workers who were separated from 
service due to redundancy; that the cooperatives were formed by the immediate dependents and relatives of 
the permanent workers of petitioner; that these cooperatives were registered with the CDA; and that these 
cooperatives were authorized by their respective constitutions and by-laws to engage in the job contracting 
business.[8] 
 
The Task Force submitted a report on 3 June 1993 identifying six cooperatives that were engaged in labor-
only contracting, one of which was CAMPCO. The DOLE Regional Office No. XI held a conference on 18 
August 1993 wherein the representatives of the cooperatives named by the Task Force were given the 
opportunity to explain the nature of their activities in relation to petitioner. Subsequently, the cooperatives 
were required to submit their position papers and other supporting documents, which they did on 30 August
1993. Petitioner likewise submitted its position paper on 15 September 1993.[9] 
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On 19 October 1993, Director Parel of DOLE Regional Office No. XI issued an Order[10] in which he made 
the following findings â€“ 
Records submitted to this Office show that the six (6) aforementioned cooperatives are all duly registered 
with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA). These cooperatives were also found engaging in 
different activities with DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC. a company engaged in the production of pineapple and 
export of pineapple products. Incidentally, some of these cooperatives were also found engaging in 
activities which are directly related to the principal business or operations of the company. This is true in 
the case of the THREE (3) Cooperatives, namely; Adventurer's Multi Purpose Cooperative, Human 
Resource Multi Purpose Cooperative and Cannery Multi Purpose Cooperative. 
 
From the foregoing findings and evaluation of the activities of Adventurer's Multi Purpose Cooperative, 
Human Resource Multi Purpose Cooperative and Cannery Multi Purpose Cooperative, this Office finds and
so holds that they are engaging in Labor Only Contracting Activities as defined under Section 9, Rule VIII, 
Book III of the rules implementing the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended which we quote: 
"Section 9 Labor Only Contracting â€“ a) Any person who undertakes to supply workers to an employer 
shall be deemed to be engaged in labor-only contracting where such person: 
 
1) Does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work 
premises and other materials; and 
 
2) The workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to 
the principal business or operation of the employer to which workers are habitually employed. 
 
b) Labor-only contracting as defined herein is hereby prohibited and the person acting as contractor shall be
considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in 
the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him." 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, ADVENTURER'S MULTI PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, HUMAN 
RESOURCE MULTI PURPOSE COOPERATIVE and CANNERY MULTI PURPOSE COOPERATIVE 
are hereby declared to be engaged in labor only contracting which is a prohibited activity. The same 
cooperatives are therefore ordered to cease and desist from further engaging in such activities. 
 
The three (3) other cooperatives, namely Polomolok Skilled Workers Multi Purpose Cooperative, Unified 
Engineering and Manpower Service Multi Purpose Cooperative and Tibud sa Katibawasan Multi Purpose 
Cooperative whose activities may not be directly related to the principal business of DOLE Philippines, Inc
are also advised not to engage in labor only contracting with the company. 
All the six cooperatives involved appealed the afore-quoted Order to the Office of the DOLE Secretary, 
raising the sole issue that DOLE Regional Director Director Parel committed serious error of law in 
directing the cooperatives to cease and desist from engaging in labor-only contracting. On 15 September 
1994, DOLE Undersecretary Cresencio B. Trajano, by the authority of the DOLE Secretary, issued an 
Order[11] dismissing the appeal on the basis of the following ratiocination â€“  
The appeal is devoid of merit. 
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The Regional Director has jurisdiction to issue a cease and desist order as provided by Art. 106 of the 
Labor Code, as amended, to wit: 
"Art. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. x x x 
 
x x x x 
The Secretary of Labor may, by appropriate regulations, restrict or prohibit the contracting out of labor to 
protect the rights of workers established under this Code. In so prohibiting or restricting, he may make 
appropriate distinctions between labor only contracting and job contracting as well as differentiations 
within these types of contracting and determine who among the parties involved shall be considered the 
employer for purposes of this Code, to prevent any violation or circumvention of any provision of this Code
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
There is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does not have 
substantial capital or investment in the forms of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among 
others, and the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly 
related to the principal business of the employer. In such cases, the person or the intermediary shall be 
considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner 
and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him." 
in relation to Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7730, which reads: 
"Art. 128. Visitorial and Enforcement Power. 
b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases where 
the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly 
authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor 
standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and
enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection. The Secretary or his 
duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the 
enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor 
employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary proof which were not 
considered in the course of inspection. 
 
An order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under this 
article may be appealed to the latter. In case said order involves a monetary award, an appeal by the 
employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash bond issued by a reputable bonding company 
duly accredited by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the amount equivalent to the monetary award
in the order appealed from." 
The records reveal that in the course of the inspection of the premises of Dolefil, it was found out that the 
activities of the members of the [cooperatives] are necessary and desirable in the principal business of the 
former; and that they do not have the necessary investment in the form of tools and equipments. It is worthy
to note that the cooperatives did not deny that they do not have enough capital in the form of tools and 
equipment. Under the circumstances, it could not be denied that the [cooperatives] are considered as labor-
only contractors in relation to the business operation of DOLEFIL, INC. 
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Thus, Section 9, Rule VIII, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, provides that:  
"Sec. 9. Labor-only contracting. â€“ (a) Any person who undertakes to supply workers to an employer shall
be deemed to be engaged in labor-only contracting where such person: 
(1) Does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work 
premises and other materials; and 
 
(2) The workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to 
the principal business or operations of the employer in which workers are habitually employed. 
 
(b) Labor-only contracting as defined herein is hereby prohibited and the person acting as a contractor shall 
be considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers 
in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him. 
x x x x" 
Violation of the afore-quoted provision is considered a labor standards violation and thus, within the 
visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor and Employment (Art. 128). 
 
The Regional Director's authority to issue a cease and desist order emanates from Rule I, Section 3 of the 
Rules on Disposition of Labor Standard Cases in the Regional Offices, to wit:  
"Section 3. Authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. â€“ The Regional 
Directors shall be the duly authorized representatives of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the 
administration and enforcement of the labor standards within their respective territorial jurisdiction." 
The power granted under Article 106 of the Labor Code to the Secretary of Labor and Employment to 
restrict or prohibit the contracting out of labor to protect the rights of workers established under the Code is 
delegated to the Regional Directors by virtue of the above-quoted provision. 
 
The reason why "labor-only" contracting is prohibited under the Labor Code is that it encourages 
circumvention of the provisions of the Labor Code on the workers' right to security of tenure and to self-
organization. 
 
WHEREFORE, the respondents' Appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Order of the 
Regional Director, Regional Office No. XI, Davao City, is AFFIRMED. 
After the motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Order was denied, no further motion was filed by the 
parties, and the Order, dated 15 September 1994, of DOLE Undersecretary Trajano became final and 
executory. A Writ of Execution[12] was issued by DOLE Regional Office No. XI only on 27 July 1999, 
years after the issuance of the order subject of the writ. The DOLE Regional Office No. XI was informed 
that CAMPCO and two other cooperatives "continued to operate at DOLE Philippines, Inc. despite the 
cease and desist Order" it had issued. It therefore commanded the Sheriff to proceed to the premises of 
CAMPCO and the two other cooperatives and implement its Order dated 19 October 1993. 
 
Respondent's Complaint before the NLRC 
 
Respondents started working for petitioner at various times in the years 1993 and 1994, by virtue of the 
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Service Contract executed between CAMPCO and petitioner. All of the respondents had already rendered 
more than one year of service to petitioner. While some of the respondents were still working for petitioner,
others were put on "stay home status" on varying dates in the years 1994, 1995, and 1996 and were no 
longer furnished with work thereafter. Together, respondents filed a Complaint,[13] on 19 December 1996, 
with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), for illegal dismissal, regularization, wage 
differentials, damages and attorney's fees. 
 
In their Position Paper,[14] respondents reiterated and expounded on the allegations they previously made in 
their Complaint â€“ 
Sometime in 1993 and 1994, [herein petitioner] Dolefil engaged the services of the [herein respondents] 
through Cannery Multi-purpose Cooperative. A cooperative which was organized through the initiative of 
Dolefil in order to fill in the vacuum created as a result of the dismissal of the regular employees of Dolefil 
sometime in 1990 to 1993. 
 
The [respondents] were assigned at the Industrial Department of respondent Dolefil. All tools, implements 
and machineries used in performing their task such as: can processing attendant, feeder of canned 
pineapple at pineapple processing, nata de coco processing attendant, fruit cocktail processing attendant,
and etc. were provided by Dolefil. The cooperative does not have substantial capital and does not provide 
the [respondents] with the necessary tools to effectively perform their assigned task as the same are being 
provided by Dolefil. 
 
The training and instructions received by the [respondents] were provided by Dolefil. Before any of the 
[respondents] will be allowed to work, he has to undergo and pass the training prescribed by Dolefil. As a 
matter of fact, the trainers are employees of Dolefil. 
 
The [respondents] perform their assigned task inside the premises of Dolefil. At the job site, they were 
given specific task and assignment by Dolefil's supervisors assigned to supervise the works and efficiency 
of the complainants. Just like the regular employees of Dolefil, [respondents] were subjected to the same 
rules and regulations observe [sic] inside company premises and to some extent the rules applied to the 
[respondents] by the company through its officers are even stricter. 
 
The functions performed by the [respondents] are the same functions discharged by the regular employees 
of Dolefil. In fact, at the job site, the [respondents] were mixed with the regular workers of Dolefil. There is
no difference in so far as the job performed by the regular workers of Dolefil and that of the [respondents].
 
Some of the [respondents] were deprived of their employment under the scheme of "stay home status" 
where they were advised to literally stay home and wait for further instruction to report anew for work. 
However, they remained in this condition for more than six months. Hence, they were constructively or 
illegally dismissed. 
Respondents thus argued that they should be considered regular employees of petitioner given that: (1) they
were performing jobs that were usually necessary and desirable in the usual business of petitioner; (2) 
petitioner exercised control over respondents, not only as to the results, but also as to the manner by which 
they performed their assigned tasks; and (3) CAMPCO, a labor-only contractor, was merely a conduit of 
PUBLIC VERSION 
27 
PUBLIC VERSION 
petitioner. As regular employees of petitioner, respondents asserted that they were entitled to security of 
tenure and those placed on "stay home status" for more than six months had been constructively and 
illegally dismissed. Respondents further claimed entitlement to wage differential, moral damages, and 
attorney's fees. 
 
In their Supplemental Position Paper,[15] respondents presented, in support of their Complaint, the Orders of
DOLE Regional Director Parel, dated 19 October 1993, and DOLE Undersecretary Trajano, dated 15 
September 1994, finding that CAMPCO was a labor-only contractor and directing CAMPCO to cease and 
desist from any further labor-only contracting activities. 
 
Petitioner, in its Position Paper[16] filed before the NLRC, denied that respondents were its employees. 
 
Petitioner explained that it found the need to engage external services to augment its regular workforce, 
which was affected by peaks in operation, work backlogs, absenteeism, and excessive leaves. It used to 
engage the services of individual workers for definite periods specified in their employment contracts and 
never exceeding one year. However, such an arrangement became the subject of a labor case,[17] in which 
petitioner was accused of preventing the regularization of such workers. The Labor Arbiter who heard the 
case, rendered his Decision[18] on 24 June 1994 declaring that these workers fell squarely within the concept
of seasonal workers as envisaged by Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, who were hired by 
petitioner in good faith and in consonance with sound business practice; and consequently, dismissing the 
complaint against petitioner. The NLRC, in its Resolution,[19] dated 14 March 1995, affirmed in toto the 
Labor Arbiter's Decision and further found that the workers were validly and legally engaged by petitioner 
for "term employment," wherein the parties agreed to a fixed period of employment, knowingly and 
voluntarily, without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employees and 
absent any other circumstance vitiating their consent. The said NLRC Resolution became final and 
executory on 18 June 1996. Despite the favorable ruling of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, petitioner
decided to discontinue such employment arrangement. Yet, the problem of petitioner as to shortage of 
workforce due to the peaks in operation, work backlogs, absenteeism, and excessive leaves, persisted. 
Petitioner then found a solution in the engagement of cooperatives such as CAMPCO to provide the 
necessary additional services. 
 
Petitioner contended that respondents were owners-members of CAMPCO; that CAMPCO was a duly-
organized and registered cooperative which had already grown into a multi-million enterprise; that 
CAMPCO was engaged in legitimate job-contracting with its own owners-members rendering the contract 
work; that under the express terms and conditions of the Service Contract executed between petitioner (the 
principal) and CAMPCO (the contractor), the latter shall undertake the contract work on its own account, 
under its own responsibility, and according to its own manner and method free from the control and 
direction of the petitioner in all matters connected with the performance of the work, except as to the result 
thereof; and since CAMPCO held itself out to petitioner as a legitimate job contractor, respondents, as 
owners-members of CAMPCO, were estopped from denying or refuting the same. 
 
Petitioner further averred that Department Order No. 10, amending the rules implementing Books III and 
VI of the Labor Code, as amended, promulgated by the DOLE on 30 May 1997, explicitly recognized the 
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arrangement between petitioner and CAMPCO as permissible contracting and subcontracting, to wit â€“ 
Section 6. Permissible contracting and subcontracting. â€“ Subject to the conditions set forth in Section 
3(d) and (e) and Section 5 hereof, the principal may engage the services of a contractor or subcontractor for 
the performance of any of the following; 
 
(a) Works or services temporarily or occasionally needed to meet abnormal increase in the demand of 
products or services, provided that the normal production capacity or regular workforce of the principal 
cannot reasonably cope with such demands; 
 
(b) Works or services temporarily or occasionally needed by the principal for undertakings requiring expert 
or highly technical personnel to improve the management or operations of an enterprise; 
 
(c) Services temporarily needed for the introduction or promotion of new products, only for the duration of 
the introductory or promotional period; 
 
(d) Works or services not directly related or not integral to the main business or operation of the principal, 
including casual work, janitorial, security, landscaping, and messengerial services, and work not related to 
manufacturing processes in manufacturing establishments; 
 
(e) Services involving the public display of manufacturer's products which does not involve the act of 
selling or issuance of receipts or invoices; 
 
(f) Specialized works involving the use of some particular, unusual, or peculiar skills, expertise, tools or 
equipment the performance of which is beyond the competence of the regular workforce or production 
capacity of the principal; and 
 
(g) Unless a reliever system is in place among the regular workforce, substitute services for absent regular 
employees, provided that the period of service shall be coextensive with the period of absence and the same
is made clear to the substitute employee at the time of engagement. The phrase "absent regular employees" 
includes those who are serving suspensions or other disciplinary measures not amounting to termination of 
employment meted out by the principal, but excludes those on strike where all the formal requisites for the 
legality of the strike have been prima facie complied with based on the records filed with the National 
Conciliation and Mediation Board. 
According to petitioner, the services rendered by CAMPCO constituted permissible job contracting under 
the afore-quoted paragraphs (a), (c), and (g), Section 6 of DOLE Department Order No. 10, series of 1997.
 
After the parties had submitted their respective Position Papers, the Labor Arbiter promulgated its 
Decision[20] on 11 June 1999, ruling entirely in favor of petitioner, ratiocinating thus â€“ 
After judicious review of the facts, narrated and supporting documents adduced by both parties, the 
undersigned finds [and] holds that CAMPCO is not engaged in labor-only contracting. 
 
Had it not been for the issuance of Department Order No. 10 that took effect on June 22, 1997 which in the 
contemplation of Law is much later compared to the Order promulgated by the Undersecretary Cresencio 
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Trajano of Department of [L]abor and Employment, the undersigned could safely declared [sic] otherwise. 
However, owing to the principle observed and followed in legal practice that the later law or jurisprudence 
controls, the reliance to Secretary Trajano's order is overturned. 
 
Labor-only contracting as amended by Department [O]rder No. 10 is defined in this wise: 
"Labor-only contracting is prohibited under this Rule is an arrangement where the contractor or 
subcontractor merely recruits, supplied [sic] or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a 
principal, and the following elements are present: 
 
i) The contractor or sub-contractor does not have substantial capital or investment to actually perform the 
job, work, or service under its own account & responsibility, and 
 
ii) The employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing 
activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal." 
Verification of the records reveals that per Annexes "J" and "K" of [herein petitioner DolePhil's] position 
paper, which are the yearly audited Financial Statement and Balance Sheet of CAMPCO shows [sic] that it 
has more than substantial capital or investment in order to qualify as a legitimate job contractor. 
 
We likewise recognize the validity of the contract entered into and between CAMPCO and [petitioner] for 
the former to assists [sic] the latter in its operations and in the performance of odd jobs â€“ such as the 
augmentation of regular manning particularly during peaks in operation, work back logs, absenteeism and 
excessive leave availment of respondent's regular employees. The rule is well-settled that labor laws 
discourage interference with an employer's judgment in the conduct of his business. Even as the law is 
solicitors [sic] of the welfare of the employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise 
what are clearly management prerogatives. The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs
to achieve its purpose cannot be denied (Yuco Chemical Industries vs. Ministry of [L]abor, GR No. 75656, 
May 28, 1990). 
 
CAMPCO being engaged in legitimate contracting, cannot therefore declared [sic] as guilty of labor-only 
contracting which [herein respondents] want us to believe. 
 
The second issue is likewise answered in the negative. The reason is plain and simple[,] section 12 of 
Department [O]rder No. 10 states: 
"Section 12. Employee-employer relationship. Except in cases provided for in Section 13, 14, 15 & 17, the 
contractor or subcontractor shall be considered the employer of the contractual employee for purposes of 
enforcing the provisions of the Code." 
The Resolution of NLRC 5th division, promulgated on March 14, 1 1995 [sic] categorically declares: 
"Judging from the very nature of the terms and conditions of their hiring, the Commission finds the 
complainants to have been engaged to perform work, although necessary or desirable to the business of 
respondent company, for a definite period or what is community called TERM EMPLOYMENT. It is clear 
from the evidence and record that the nature of the business and operation of respondent company has its 
peaks and valleys and therefore, it is not difficult to discern, inclement weather, or high availment by 
regular workers of earned leave credits, additional workers categorized as casuals, or temporary, are needed
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to meet the exigencies." (Underlining in the original) 
The validity of fixed-period employment has been consistently upheld by the Supreme [C]ourt in a long 
line of cases, the leading case of which is Brent School, Inc. vs. Zamora & Alegre, GR No. 48494, February
5, 1990. Thus at the end of the contract the employer-employee relationship is terminated. It behooves upon
us to rule that herein complainants cannot be declared regular rank and file employees of the [petitioner] 
company. 
 
Anent the third issue, [respondents] dismally failed to provide us the exact figures needed for the 
computation of their wage differentials. To simply alleged [sic] that one is underpaid of his wages is not 
enough. No bill of particulars was submitted. Moreover, the Order of RTWPB Region XI, Davao City 
dated February 21, 1996 exempts [petitioner] company from complying Wage Order No. 04 [sic] in so far 
as such exemption applies only to workers who are not covered by the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 
for the period January 1 to December 31, 1995,. [sic] In so far as [respondents] were not privies to the 
CBA, they were the workers referred to by RTWPB's Order. [H]ence, [respondents'] claims for wage 
differentials are hereby dismissed for lack of factual basis. 
 
We find no further necessity in delving into the issues raised by [respondents] regarding moral damages 
and attorney's fees for being moot and academic because of the findings that CAMPCO does not engaged 
[sic] in labor-only contracting and that [respondents] cannot be declared as regular employees of 
[petitioner]. 
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in the above-entitled case, dismissing 
the complaint for lack of merit. 
Respondents appealed the Labor Arbiter's Decision to the NLRC, reiterating their position that they should 
be recognized as regular employees of the petitioner since CAMPCO was a mere labor-only contractor, as 
already declared in the previous Orders of DOLE Regional Director Parel, dated 19 October 1993, and 
DOLE Undersecretary Trajano, dated 15 September 1994, which already became final and executory. The 
NLRC, in its Resolution,[21] dated 29 February 2000, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Labor Arbiter's 
Decision, reasoning as follows â€“ 
We find no merit in the appeal. 
 
The concept of conclusiveness of judgment under the principle of "res judicata" means that where between 
the first case wherein judgment is rendered and the second case wherein such judgment is invoked, there is 
identity of parties, but there is no identity of cause of action, the judgment is conclusive in the second case, 
only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely 
involved therein (Viray, etc. vs. Marinas, et al., 49 SCRA 44). There is no denying that the order of the 
Department of Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. XI in case No. RI100-9310-RI-355, which the 
complainants perceive to have sealed the status of CAMPCO as labor-only contractor, proceeded from the 
visitorial and enforcement power of the Department Secretary under Article 128 of the Labor Code. Acting 
on reports that the cooperatives, including CAMPCO, that operated and offered services at [herein 
petitioner] company were engaging in labor-only contracting activities, that Office conducted a routinary 
inspection over the records of said cooperatives and consequently, found the latter to be engaging in labor-
only contracting activities. This being so, [petitioner] company was not a real party-in-interest in said case, 
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but the cooperatives concerned. Therefore, there is no identity of parties between said case and the present 
case which means that the afore-said ruling of the DOLE is not binding and conclusive upon [petitioner] 
company. 
 
It is not correct, however, to say, as the Labor Arbiter did, that the afore-said ruling of the Department of 
Labor and Employment has been overturned by Department Order No. 10. It is a basic principle that "once 
a judgment becomes final it cannot be disturbed, except for clerical errors or when supervening events 
render its execution impossible or unjust" (Sampaguita Garmens [sic] Corp. vs. NLRC, G. R. No. 102406, 
June 7, 1994). Verily, the subsequent issuance of Department Order No. 10 cannot be construed as 
supervening event that would render the execution of said judgment impossible or unjust. Department 
Order No. 10 refers to the ramification of some provisions of the Rules Implementing Articles 106 and 109 
of the Labor Code, without substantially changing the definition of "labor-only" or "job" contracting. 
 
Well-settled is the rule that to qualify as an independent job contractor, one has either substantial capital 
"or" investment in the form of tools, equipment and machineries necessary to carry out his business (see 
Virginia Neri, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. Nos. 97008-89, July 23, 1993). CAMPCO has admittedly a 
paid-up capital of P4,562,470.25 and this is more than enough to qualify it as an independent job 
contractor, as aptly held by the Labor Arbiter. 
 
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED. 
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals 
 
Refusing to concede defeat, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under 
Rule 65 of the revised Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that the NLRC acted without or in excess of its 
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when, in its Resolution, 
dated 29 February 2000, it (1) ruled that CAMPCO was a bona fide independent job contractor with 
substantial capital, notwithstanding the fact that at the time of its organization and registration with CDA, it 
only had a paid-up capital of P6,600.00; and (2) refused to apply the doctrine of res judicata against 
petitioner. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision,[22] dated 20 May 2002, granted due course to respondents' 
Petition, and set aside the assailed NLRC Decision. Pertinent portions of the Court of Appeals Decision are 
reproduced below â€“ 
In the case at bench, it was established during the proceedings before the [NLRC] that CAMPCO has a 
substantial capital. However, having a substantial capital does not per se qualify CAMPCO as a job 
contractor. In order to be considered an independent contractor it is not enough to show substantial 
capitalization or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machinery and work premises. The 
conjunction "and," in defining what a job contractor is, means that aside from having a substantial capital or
investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premise, and other materials which are 
necessary in the conduct of his business, the contractor must be able to prove that it also carries on an 
independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under his own responsibility 
according to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal 
in all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof. [Herein petitioner
DolePhil] has failed to prove, except for the substantial capital requirement, that CAMPCO has met the 
other requirements. It was not established that CAMPCO is engaged or carries on an independent business. 
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In the performance of the respective tasks of workers deployed by CAMPCO with [petitioner], it was not 
established that CAMPCO undertook the contract of work it entered with [petitioner] under its own account
and its own responsibility. It is [petitioner] who provides the procedures to be followed by the workers in 
the performance of their assigned work. The workers deployed by CAMPCO to [petitioner] performed 
activities which are directly related to the principal business or operations of the employer in which 
workers are habitually employed since [petitioner] admitted that these workers were engaged to perform the
job of other regular employees who cannot report for work. 
 
Moreover, [NLRC] likewise gravely erred in not giving weight to the Order dated 19 October 1993 issued 
by the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, through Undersecretary 
Cresencio Trajano, which affirmed the findings of the Department of Labor and Employment Regional 
Office, Region XI, Davao City that Cannery Multi-Purpose Cooperative is one of the cooperatives engaged 
in labor-only contracting activities. 
 
In the exercise of the visitorial and enforcement power of the Department of Labor and Employment, an 
investigation was conducted among the cooperatives organized and existing in Polomolok, South Cotabato, 
relative to labor-only contracting activities. One of the cooperatives investigated was Cannery Multi-
Purpose Cooperative. After the investigation, the Department of Labor and Employment, Regional Office 
No. XI, Davao City, through its Regional Director, issued the Order dated 19 October 1993, stating: 
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, ADVENTURER'S MULTI PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, HUMAN 
RESOURCE MULTI PURPOSE SKILLED COOPERATIVE and CANNERY MULTI PURPOSE 
COOPERATIVE are hereby declared to be engaged in labor only contracting which is a prohibited activity.
The same cooperatives are therefore ordered to cease and desist from further engaging in such activities. 
x x x x 
 
SO ORDERED." 
Cannery Multi Purpose Cooperative, together with the other cooperatives declared as engaged in labor-only
contracting activity, appeal the above-findings to the Secretary of the Department of Labor and 
Employment. Their appeal was dismissed for lack of merit as follows:: [sic] 
 
x x x x 
 
[NLRC] held that CAMPCO, being not a real party-in interest in the above-case, the said ruling is not 
binding and conclusive upon [petitioner]. This Court, however, finds the contrary. 
 
CAMPCO was one of the cooperatives investigated by the Department of Labor and Employment, 
Regional Office No. XI, Davao City, pursuant to Article 128 of the Labor Code. It was one of the 
appellants before the Secretary of the Department of Labor questioning the decision of the Regional 
Director of DOLE, Regional Office No. XI, Davao City. This Court noted that in the proceedings therein, 
and as mentioned in the decision rendered by Undersecretary Cresencio B. Trajano of the Department of 
Labor and Employment, Manila, regarding the cooperatives' appeal thereto, the parties therein, including 
Cannery Multi-Purpose Cooperative, submitted to the said office their position papers and Articles of 
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Cooperatives and Certification of Registrations [sic] on 30 August 1993. This is a clear indicia that 
CAMPCO participated in the proceedings therein. [NLRC], therefore, committed grave abuse of discretion 
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it held that CAMPCO was never a party to the said case.
 
[Petitioner] invokes Section 6 of Department Order No. 10, series of 1997, issued by the Department of 
Labor and Employment which took effect on 22 June 1997. The said section identified the circumstances 
which are permissible job contracting, to wit: 
 
x x x x 
 
[Petitioner's] main contention is based on the decisions rendered by the labor arbiter and [NLRC] which are 
both anchored on Department Order No. 10 issued by the Department of Labor and Employment. The said 
department order provided for several flexible working relations between a principal, a contractor or 
subcontractor and the workers recruited by the latter and deployed to the former. In the case at bench, 
[petitioner] posits that the engagement of [petitioner] of the workers deployed by CAMPCO was pursuant 
to D.O. No. 10, Series of 1997. 
 
However, on 8 May 2001, the Department of Labor and Employment issued Department Order No. 3, 
series of 2001, revoking Department Order No. 10, series of 1997. The said department order took effect on
29 May 2001. 
 
x x x x 
 
Under Department Order No. 3, series of 2001, some contracting and outsourcing arrangements are no 
longer legitimate modes of employment relation. Having revoked Department Order No. 10, series of 1997,
[petitioner] can no longer support its argument by relying on the revoked department order. 
 
Considering that [CAMPCO] is not a job contractor, but one engaged in labor-only contracting, CAMPCO 
serves only as an agent of [petitioner] pursuant to par. (b) of Sec. 9, Rule VIII, Book III of the 
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, stating, 
 
x x x x 
 
However, the Court cannot declare that [herein respondents] are regular employees of [petitioner]. x x x 
 
x x x x 
 
In the case at bench, although [respondents] were engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary
or desirable in the usual business or trade of private respondent, it is apparent, however, that their services 
were engaged by [petitioner] only for a definite period. [Petitioner's] nature of business and operation has 
its peaks. In order to meet the demands during peak seasons they necessarily have to engage the services of 
workers to work only for a particular season. In the case of [respondents], when they were deployed by 
CAMPCO with [petitioner] and were assigned by the latter at its cannery department, they were aware that 
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they will be working only for a certain duration, and this was made known to them at the time they were 
employed, and they agreed to the same. 
 
x x x x 
 
The non-rehiring of some of the petitioners who were allegedly put on a "floating status" is an indication 
that their services were no longer needed. They attained their "floating status" only after they have finished 
their contract of employment, or after the duration of the season that they were employed. The decision of 
[petitioner] in not rehiring them means that their services were no longer needed due to the end of the 
season for which they were hired. And this Court reiterates that at the time they were deployed to 
[petitioner's] cannery division, they knew that the services they have to render or the work they will 
perform are seasonal in nature and consequently their employment is only for the duration of the season. 
 
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED DUE 
COURSE. The decision dated 29 February 2000 and Resolution dated 19 December 2000 rendered by 
[NLRC] are hereby SET ASIDE. In place thereof, it is hereby rendered that: 
1. Cannery Multi-Purpose Cooperative is a labor-only contractor as defined under the Labor Code of 
the Philippines and its implementing rules and regulations; and that 
2. DOLE Philippines Incorporated is merely an agent or intermediary of Cannery Multi-Purpose 
Cooperative. 
All other claims of [respondents] are hereby DENIED for lack of basis. 
Both petitioner and respondents filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration of the foregoing 
Decision, dated 20 May 2002, prompting the Court of Appeals to promulgate an Amended Decision on 27 
November 2003, in which it ruled in this wise: 
This court examined again the documentary evidence submitted by the [herein petitioner] and we rule not 
to disturb our findings in our Decision dated May 20, 2002. It is our opinion that there was no competent 
evidence submitted that would show that CAMPCO is engaged to perform a specific and special job or 
service which is one of the strong indicators that an entity is an independent contractor. The articles of 
cooperation and by-laws of CAMPCO do not show that it is engaged in performing a specific and special 
job or service. What is clear is that it is a multi-purpose cooperative organized under RA No. 6938, nothing 
more, nothing less. 
 
As can be gleaned from the contract that CAMPCO entered into with the [petitioner], the undertaking of 
CAMPCO is to provide [petitioner] with workforce by assisting the company in its daily operations and 
perform odd jobs as may be assigned. It is our opinion that CAMPCO merely acted as recruitment agency 
for [petitioner]. CAMPCO by supplying manpower only, clearly conducted itself as "labor-only" 
contractor. As can be gleaned from the service contract, the work performed by the [herein respondents] are
directly related to the main business of the [petitioner]. Clearly, the requisites of "labor-only" contracting 
are present in the case at bench. 
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In view of the above ruling, we find it unnecessary to discuss whether the Order of Undersecretary Trajano 
finding that CAMPCO is a "labor-only" contractor is a determining factor or constitutes res judicata in the 
case at bench. Our findings that CAMPCO is a "labor-only" contractor is based on the evidence presented 
vis-Ã¡-vis the rulings of the Supreme Court on the matter. 
 
Since, the argument that the [petitioner] is the real employer of the [respondents], the next question that 
must be answered is â€“ what is the nature of the employment of the petitioners? 
 
x x x x 
 
The afore-quoted [Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended] provides for two kinds of employment, 
namely: (1) regular (2) casual. In our Decision, we ruled that the [respondents] while performing work 
necessary and desirable to the business of the [petitioner] are seasonal employees as their services were 
engaged by the [petitioner] for a definite period or only during peak season. 
 
In the most recent case of Hacienda Fatima v. National Federation of Sugarcane Workers Food and 
General Trade, the Supreme Court ruled that for employees to be excluded from those classified as regular 
employees, it is not enough that they perform work or services that are seasonal in nature. They must have 
also been employed only for the duration of one season. It is undisputed that the [respondents'] services 
were engaged by the [petitioner] since 1993 and 1994. The instant complaint was filed in 1996 when the 
[respondents] were placed on floating status. Evidently, [petitioner] employed the [respondents] for more 
than one season. Therefore, the general rule on regular employment is applicable. The herein petitioners 
who performed their jobs in the workplace of the [petitioner] every season for several years, are considered 
the latter's regular employees for having performed works necessary and desirable to the business of the 
[petitioner]. The [petitioner's] eventual refusal to use their servicesâ€”even if they were ready, able and 
willing to perform their usual duties whenever these were availableâ€”and hiring other workers to perform 
the tasks originally assigned to [respondents] amounted to illegal dismissal of the latter. We thus, correct 
our earlier ruling that the herein petitioners are seasonal workers. They are regular employees within the 
contemplation of Article 280 of the Labor Code and thus cannot be dismissed except for just or authorized 
cause. The Labor Code provides that when there is a finding of illegal dismissal, the effect is that the 
employee dismissed shall be reinstated to his former position without loss of seniority rights with 
backwages from the date of his dismissal up to his actual reinstatement. 
 
This court however, finds no basis for the award of damages and attorney's fees in favor of the petitioners.
 
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 20, 2002 rendered by this Court is hereby AMENDED as 
follows: 
 
1) [Petitioner] DOLE PHILIPPINES is hereby declared the employer of the [respondents]. 
 
2) [Petitioner] DOLE PHILIPPINES is hereby declared guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered to 
immediately reinstate the [respondents] to their former position without loss of seniority rights and other 
benefits, and to pay each of the [respondents] backwages from the date of the filing of illegal dismissal on 
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December 19, 1996 up to actual reinstatement, the same to be computed by the labor arbiter. 
 
3) The claims for damages and attorney's fees are hereby denied for lack of merit. 
 
No costs.[23] 
The Petition at Bar 
 
Aggrieved by the Decision, dated 20 May 2002, and the Amended Decision, dated 27 November 2003, of 
the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 
revised Rules of Civil Procedure, in which it made the following assignment of errors â€“ 
 
I. 
 
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DEPARTED FROM THE USUAL COURSE OF JUDCIAL 
PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT MADE ITS OWN FACTUAL FINDINGS AND DISREGARDED THE 
UNIFORM AND CONSISTENT FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER AND THE NLRC, 
WHICH MUST BE ACCORDED GREAT WEIGHT, RESPECT AND EVEN FINALITY. IN SO DOING,
THE COURT OF APPEALS EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF 
THE RULES OF COURT. 
II. 
 
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN 
ACCORD WITH THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, APPLICABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS AND 
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN NOT HOLDING THAT DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 10, 
SERIES OF 1997 IS THE APPLICABLE REGULATION IN THIS CASE. IN GIVING RETROACTIVE 
APPLICATION TO DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 3, SERIES OF 2001, THE COURT OF APPEALS 
VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AGAINST IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS AND
DEPRIVED PETITIONER OF THE DUE PROCESS OF THE LAW. 
III. 
 
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DETERMINED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD 
WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 
1993 ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF LABOR, WHICH AFFIRMED THE FINDINGS 
OF THE DOLE REGIONAL OFFICE (REGION XI, DAVAO CITY) THAT CAMPCO IS ONE OF THE 
COOPERATIVES ENGAGED IN LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING ACTIVITIES. 
IV. 
 
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DETERMINED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD 
WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENTS, BY ACTIVELY 
REPRESENTING THEMSELVES AND WARRANTING THAT THEY ARE ENGAGED IN 
LEGITIMATE JOB CONTRACTING, ARE BARRED BY THE EQUITABLE PRINCIPLE OF 
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ESTOPPEL FROM ASSERTING THAT THEY ARE REGULAR EMPLOYEES OF PETITIONER. 
V. 
 
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DETERMINED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD 
WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN RULING THAT CAMPCO IS ENGAGED IN THE 
PROHIBITED ACT OF "LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING" DESPITE THERE BEING SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY. 
VI. 
 
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DETERMINED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD 
WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS THE EMPLOYER OF 
RESPONDENTS AND THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF ILLEGAL DISMISSAL.[24] 
This Court's Ruling 
I 
 
Anent the first assignment of error, petitioner argues that judicial review under Rule 65 of the revised Rules
of Civil Procedure is limited only to issues concerning want or excess or jurisdiction or grave abuse of 
discretion. The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and 
not mere errors of judgment. It is the contention of petitioner that the NLRC properly assumed jurisdiction 
over the parties and subject matter of the instant case. The errors assigned by the respondents in their 
Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals do not pertain to the jurisdiction of the NLRC; they are 
rather errors of judgment supposedly committed by the the NLRC, in its Resolution, dated 29 February 
2000, and are thus not the proper subject of a petition for certiorari. Petitioner also posits that the Petition 
for Certiorari filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals raised questions of fact that would necessitate
a review by the appellate court of the evidence presented by the parties before the Labor Arbiter and the 
NLRC, and that questions of fact are not a fit subject for a special civil action for certiorari. 
 
It has long been settled in the landmark case of St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC,[25] that the mode for 
judicial review over decisions of the NLRC is by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the revised 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The different modes of appeal, namely, writ of error (Rule 41), petition for 
review (Rules 42 and 43), and petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45), cannot be availed of because 
there is no provision on appellate review of NLRC decisions in the Labor Code, as amended.[26] Although 
the same case recognizes that both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction 
over such petitions, it has chosen to impose the strict observance of the hierarchy of courts. Hence, a 
petition for certiorari of a decision or resolution of the NLRC should first be filed with the Court of 
Appeals; direct resort to the Supreme Court shall not be allowed unless the redress desired cannot be 
obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify an availment 
of a remedy within and calling for the exercise by the Supreme Court of its primary jurisdiction. 
 
The extent of judicial review by certiorari of decisions or resolutions of the NLRC, as exercised previously 
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by the Supreme Court and, now, by the Court of Appeals, is described in Zarate v. Olegario,[27] thus â€“ 
The rule is settled that the original and exclusive jurisdiction of this Court to review a decision of 
respondent NLRC (or Executive Labor Arbiter as in this case) in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 
does not normally include an inquiry into the correctness of its evaluation of the evidence. Errors of 
judgment, as distinguished from errors of jurisdiction, are not within the province of a special civil action 
for certiorari, which is merely confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. It is thus 
incumbent upon petitioner to satisfactorily establish that respondent Commission or executive labor arbiter 
acted capriciously and whimsically in total disregard of evidence material to or even decisive of the 
controversy, in order that the extraordinary writ of certiorari will lie. By grave abuse of discretion is meant 
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be 
shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. For certiorari to lie, there must be 
capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in 
accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions. 
The Court of Appeals, therefore, can grant the Petition for Certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its 
assailed decision or resolution, committed grave abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or 
arbitrarily disregarding evidence which is material or decisive of the controversy; and the Court of Appeals 
can not make this determination without looking into the evidence presented by the parties. Necessarily, the
appellate court can only evaluate the materiality or significance of the evidence, which is alleged to have 
been capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by the NLRC, in relation to all other evidence on 
record. 
 
As this Court elucidated in Garcia v. National Labor Relations Commission[28]-- 
[I]n Ong v. People, we ruled that certiorari can be properly resorted to where the factual findings 
complained of are not supported by the evidence on record. Earlier, in Gutib v. Court of Appeals, we 
emphasized thus: 
[I]t has been said that a wide breadth of discretion is granted a court of justice in certiorari proceedings. The
cases in which certiorari will issue cannot be defined, because to do so would be to destroy its 
comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the court that authority is not wanting to 
show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of our 
superintending control over inferior courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular 
case "as the ends of justice may require." So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a 
substantial wrong or to do substantial justice. 
And in another case of recent vintage, we further held: 
In the review of an NLRC decision through a special civil action for certiorari, resolution is confined only 
to issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the labor tribunal. Hence, the Court 
refrains from reviewing factual assessments of lower courts and agencies exercising adjudicative functions, 
such as the NLRC. Occasionally, however, the Court is constrained to delve into factual matters where, as 
in the instant case, the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the Labor Arbiter. 
 
In this instance, the Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may look into the records of the case and 
re-examine the questioned findings. As a corollary, this Court is clothed with ample authority to review 
matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in their appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary
to arrive at a just decision of the case. The same principles are now necessarily adhered to and are applied 
PUBLIC VERSION 
39 
PUBLIC VERSION 
by the Court of Appeals in its expanded jurisdiction over labor cases elevated through a petition for 
certiorari; thus, we see no error on its part when it made anew a factual determination of the matters and on 
that basis reversed the ruling of the NLRC. 
II 
 
The second assignment of error delves into the significance and application to the case at bar of the two 
department orders issued by DOLE. Department Order No. 10, series of 1997, amended the implementing 
rules of Books III and VI of the Labor Code, as amended. Under this particular DOLE department order, 
the arrangement between petitioner and CAMPCO would qualify as permissible contracting. Department 
Order No. 3, series of 2001, revoked Department Order No. 10, series of 1997, and reiterated the 
prohibition on labor-only contracting. 
 
Attention is called to the fact that the acts complained of by the respondents occurred well before the 
issuance of the two DOLE department orders in 1997 and 2001. The Service Contract between DOLE and 
CAMPCO was executed on 17 August 1993. Respondents started working for petitioner sometime in 1993 
and 1994. While some of them continued to work for petitioner, at least until the filing of the Complaint, 
others were put on "stay home status" at various times in 1994, 1995, and 1996. Respondents filed their 
Complaint with the NLRC on 19 December 1996. 
 
A basic rule observed in this jurisdiction is that no statute, decree, ordinance, rule or regulation shall be 
given retrospective effect unless explicitly stated.[29] Since there is no provision at all in the DOLE 
department orders that expressly allowed their retroactive application, then the general rule should be 
followed, and the said orders should be applied only prospectively. 
 
Which now brings this Court to the question as to what was the prevailing rule on labor-only contracting 
from 1993 to 1996, the period when the occurrences subject of the Complaint before the NLRC took place.
 
Article 106 of the Labor Code, as amended, permits legitimate job contracting, but prohibits labor-only 
contracting. The said provision reads â€“ 
ART. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. â€“ Whenever an employer enters into a contract with another 
person for the performance of the former's work, the employees of the contractor and of the latter's 
subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code. 
 
In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with 
this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such 
employees to the extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is 
liable to employees directly employed by him. 
 
The Secretary of Labor may, by appropriate regulations, restrict or prohibit the contracting out of labor to 
protect the rights of workers established under this Code. In so prohibiting or restricting, he may make 
appropriate distinctions between labor-only contracting and job contracting as well as differentiations 
within these types of contracting and determine who among the parties involved shall be considered the 
employer for purposes of this Code, to prevent any violation or circumvention of any provision of this 
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Code. 
 
There is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does not have 
substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among 
others, and the workers recruited and placed by such persons are performing activities which are directly 
related to the principal business of such employer. In such cases, the person or intermediary shall be 
considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner 
and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him. 
To implement the foregoing provision of the Labor Code, as amended, Sections 8 and 9, Rule VIII, Book 
III of the implementing rules, in force since 1976 and prior to their amendment by DOLE Department 
Order No. 10, series of 1997, provided as follows â€“ 
Sec. 8. Job contracting. â€“ There is job contracting permissible under the Code if the following conditions 
are met; 
(1) The contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account 
under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction 
of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the 
results thereof; and 
(2) The contractor has substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work 
premises, and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business. 
 
Sec. 9. Labor-only contracting. â€“ (a) Any person who undertakes to supply workers to an employer shall 
be deemed to be engaged in labor-only contracting where such person: 
 
(1) Does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work 
premises and other materials; and 
 
(2) The workers recruited and placed by such persons are performing activities which are directly related to 
the principal business or operations of the employer in which workers are habitually employed. 
 
(b) Labor-only contracting as defined herein is hereby prohibited and the person acting as contractor shall 
be considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers 
in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him. 
 
(c) For cases not falling under this Article, the Secretary of Labor shall determine through appropriate 
orders whether or not the contracting out of labor is permissible in the light of the circumstances of each 
case and after considering the operating needs of the employer and the rights of the workers involved. In 
such case, he may prescribe conditions and restrictions to insure the protection and welfare of the workers.
Since these statutory and regulatory provisions were the ones in force during the years in question, then it 
was in consideration of the same that DOLE Regional Director Parel and DOLE Undesrsecretary Trajano 
issued their Orders on 19 September 1993 and 15 September 1994, respectively, both finding that 
CAMPCO was engaged in labor-only contracting. Petitioner, in its third assignment of error, questions the 
weight that the Court of Appeals gave these orders in its Decision, dated 20 May 2002, and Amended 
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Decision, dated 27 November 2003. 
III 
 
The Orders of DOLE Regional Director Parel, dated 19 September 1993, and of DOLE Undersecretary 
Trajano, dated 15 September 1994, were issued pursuant to the visitorial and enforcement power conferred 
by the Labor Code, as amended, on the DOLE Secretary and his duly authorized representatives, to wit â€“
ART. 128. Visitorial and enforcement power. â€“ (a) The Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized 
representatives, including labor regulation officers, shall have access to employer's records and premises at 
any time of the day or night whenever work is being undertaken therein, and the right to copy therefrom, to 
question any employee and investigate any fact, condition or matter which may be necessary to determine 
violations or which may aid in the enforcement of this Code and of any labor law, wage order or rules and 
regulations pursuant thereto. 
 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases where 
the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly 
authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor 
standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment 
and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection. The Secretary or 
his duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the 
enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor 
employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not 
considered in the course of inspection. 
 
An order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under this 
article may be appealed to the latter. In case said order involves a monetary award, an appeal by the 
employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding 
company duly accredited by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the amount equivalent to the 
monetary award in the order appealed from. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Before Regional Director Parel issued his Order, dated 19 September 1993, a Task Force investigated the 
operations of cooperatives in Polomolok, South Cotabato, and submitted a report identifying six 
cooperatives that were engaged in labor-only contracting, one of which was CAMPCO. In a conference 
before the DOLE Regional Office, the cooperatives named by the Task Force were given the opportunity to
explain the nature of their activities in relation to petitioner; and, the cooperatives, as well as petitioner, 
submitted to the DOLE Regional Office their position papers and other supporting documents to refute the 
findings of the Task Force. It was only after these procedural steps did Regional Director Parel issued his 
Order finding that three cooperatives, including CAMPCO, were indeed engaged in labor-only contracting 
and were directed to cease and desist from further engaging in such activities. On appeal, DOLE 
Undersecretary Trajano, by authority of the DOLE Secretary, affirmed Regional Director Parel's Order. 
Upon denial of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the cooperatives, and no further appeal taken 
therefrom, the Order of DOLE Undersecretary Trajano, dated 15 September 1994, became final and 
executory. 
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Petitioner avers that the foregoing Orders of the authorized representatives of the DOLE Secretary do not 
constitute res judicata in the case filed before the NLRC. This Court, however, believes otherwise and finds
that the final and executory Orders of the DOLE Secretary or his authorized representatives should bind the 
NLRC. 
 
It is obvious that the visitorial and enforcement power granted to the DOLE Secretary is in the nature of a 
quasi-judicial power. Quasi-judicial power has been described by this Court in the following manner â€“ 
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the administrative 
agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact 
to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the
law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-
judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or 
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for 
the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial 
functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence 
of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action
and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected it is elementary 
that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in the conduct of the 
proceedings.[30] (Emphasis supplied.) 
The DOLE Secretary, under Article 106 of the Labor Code, as amended, exercise quasi-judicial power, at 
least, to the extent necessary to determine violations of labor standards provisions of the Code and other 
labor legislation. He can issue compliance orders and writs of execution for the enforcement of his orders. 
As evidence of the importance and binding effect of the compliance orders of the DOLE Secretary, Article 
128 of the Labor Code, as amended, further provides â€“ 
ART. 128. Visitorial and enforcement power. â€“ 
 
x x x x 
 
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to obstruct, impede, delay or otherwise render ineffective 
the orders of the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives issued pursuant to the authority 
granted under this article, and no inferior court or entity shall issue temporary or permanent injunction or 
restraining order or otherwise assume jurisdiction over any case involving the enforcement orders issued in 
accordance with this article. 
The Orders of DOLE Regional Director Parel, dated 19 September 1993, and of DOLE Undersecretary 
Trajano, dated 15 September 1994, consistently found that CAMPCO was engaging in labor-only 
contracting. Such finding constitutes res judicata in the case filed by the respondents with the NLRC. 
 
It is well-established in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered 
pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final 
judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. The rule of res judicata, which forbids the 
reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority, applies as well to the judicial and 
quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction 
as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers. The orderly administration of justice requires 
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that the judgments or resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the 
law, rules and regulations, so as to write finis to disputes once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in
the Philippine justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations.[31] 
 
Res judicata has dual aspects, "bar by prior judgment" and "conclusiveness of judgment." This Court has 
previously clarified the difference between the two â€“ 
Section 49, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the dual aspects of res judicata in actions in 
personam. to wit: 
 
"Effect of judgment. - The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court or judge of the 
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows: 
 
x x x x 
 
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other 
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same
thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; 
 
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to 
have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which 
was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto." 
 
Section 49(b) enunciates the first concept of res judicata known as "bar by prior judgment," whereas, 
Section 49(c) is referred to as "conclusiveness of judgment." 
 
There is "bar by former judgment" when, between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the 
second case where such judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. 
When the three identities are present, the judgment on the merits rendered in the first constitutes an 
absolute bar to the subsequent action. But where between the first case wherein Judgment is rendered and 
the second case wherein such judgment is invoked, there is only identity of parties but there is no identity 
of cause of action, the judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to those matters actually and 
directly controverted and determined, and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is what is termed 
"conclusiveness of judgment." 
The second concept of res judicata, conclusiveness of judgment, is the one applicable to the case at bar. 
 
The same parties who participated in the proceedings before the DOLE Regional Office are the same 
parties involved in the case filed before the NLRC. CAMPCO, on behalf of its members, attended the 
conference before the DOLE Regional Office; submitted its position paper; filed an appeal with the DOLE 
Secretary of the Order of DOLE Regional Director Parel; and moved for reconsideration of the subsequent 
Order of DOLE Undersecretary Trajano. Petitioner, although not expressly named as a respondent in the 
DOLE investigation, was a necessary party thereto, considering that CAMPCO was rendering services to 
petitioner solely. Moreover, petitioner participated in the proceedings before the DOLE Regional Office, 
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intervening in the matter through a letter sent by its Senior Legal Officer, dated 24 May 1993, and 
submitting its own position paper. 
 
While the causes of action in the proceedings before the DOLE and the NLRC differ, they are, in fact, very 
closely related. The DOLE Regional Office conducted an investigation to determine whether CAMPCO 
was violating labor laws, particularly, those on labor-only contracting. Subsequently, it ruled that 
CAMPCO was indeed engaging in labor-only contracting activities, and thereafter ordered to cease and 
desist from doing so. Respondents came before the NLRC alleging illegal dismissal by the petitioner of 
those respondents who were put on "stay home status," and seeking regularization of respondents who were
still working for petitioner. The basis of their claims against petitioner rests on the argument that CAMPCO
was a labor-only contractor and, thus, merely an agent or intermediary of petitioner, who should be 
considered as respondents' real employer. The matter of whether CAMPCO was a labor-only contractor 
was already settled and determined in the DOLE proceedings, which should be conclusive and binding 
upon the NLRC. What were left for the determination of the NLRC were the issues on whether there was 
illegal dismissal and whether respondents should be regularized. 
 
This Court also notes that CAMPCO and DOLE still continued with their Service Contract despite the 
explicit cease and desist orders rendered by authorized DOLE officials. There is no other way to look at it 
except that CAMPCO and DOLE acted in complete defiance and disregard of the visitorial and 
enforcement power of the DOLE Secretary and his authorized representatives under Article 128 of the 
Labor Code, as amended. For the NLRC to ignore the findings of DOLE Regional Director Parel and 
DOLE Undersecretary Trajano is an unmistakable and serious undermining of the DOLE officials' 
authority. 
IV 
 
In petitioner's fourth assignment of error, it points out that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding 
respondents estopped from asserting that they were regular employees of petitioner since respondents, as 
owners-members of CAMPCO, actively represented themselves and warranted that they were engaged in 
legitimate job contracting. 
 
This Court cannot sustain petitioner's argument. 
 
It is true that CAMPCO is a cooperative composed of its members, including respondents. Nonetheless, it 
cannot be denied that a cooperative, as soon as it is registered with the CDA, attains a juridical personality 
of its own,[32] separate and distinct from its members; much in the same way that a corporation has a 
juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders, known as the doctrine of corporate fiction. 
The protection afforded by this doctrine is not absolute, but the exception thereto which necessitates the 
piercing of the corporate veil can only be made under specified circumstances. In Traders Royal Bank v. 
Court of Appeals,[33] this Court ruled that â€“ 
Petitioner cannot put up the excuse of piercing the veil of corporate entity, as this is merely an equitable 
remedy, and maybe awarded only in cases when the corporate fiction is used to defeat public convenience, 
justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime or where a corporation is a mere alter ego or business conduit 
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of a person. 
 
Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through the protective shroud which exempts 
its stockholders from liabilities that ordinarily, they could be subject to, or distinguishes one corporation 
from a seemingly separate one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction. But to do this, the court must 
be sure that the corporate fiction was misused, to such an extent that injustice, fraud, or crime was 
committed upon another, disregarding, thus, his, her, or its rights. It is the corporate entity which the law 
aims to protect by this doctrine. 
Using the above-mentioned guidelines, is petitioner entitled to a piercing of the "cooperative identity" of 
CAMPCO? This Court thinks not. 
 
It bears to emphasize that the piercing of the corporate veil is an equitable remedy, and among the maxims 
of equity are: (1) he who seeks equity must do equity, and (2) he who comes into equity must come with 
clean hands. Hence, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has 
been inequitable, unfair, dishonest, fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.[34] 
 
Petitioner does not come before this Court with clean hands. It is not an innocent party in this controversy.
 
Petitioner itself admitted that it encouraged and even helped the establishment of CAMPCO and the other 
cooperatives in Polomolok, South Cotabato. These cooperatives were established precisely to render 
services to petitioner. It is highly implausible that the petitioner was lured into entering into the Service 
Contract with CAMPCO in 1993 on the latter's misrepresentation and false warranty that it was an 
independent job contractor. Even if it is conceded that petitioner was indeed defrauded into believing that 
CAMPCO was an independent contractor, then the DOLE proceedings should have placed it on guard. 
Remember that petitioner participated in the proceedings before the DOLE Regional Office, it cannot now 
claim ignorance thereof. Furthermore, even after the issuance of the cease and desist order on CAMPCO, 
petitioner still continued with its prohibited service arrangement with the said cooperative. If petitioner was 
truly defrauded by CAMPCO and its members into believing that the cooperative was an independent job 
contractor, the more logical recourse of petitioner was to have the Service Contract voided in the light of 
the explicit findings of the DOLE officials that CAMPCO was engaging in labor-only contracting. Instead, 
petitioner still carried on its Service Contract with CAMPCO for several more years thereafter. 
V 
 
As previously discussed, the finding of the duly authorized representatives of the DOLE Secretary that 
CAMPCO was a labor-only contractor is already conclusive. This Court cannot deviate from said finding.
 
This Court, though, still notes that even an independent review of the evidence on record, in consideration 
of the proper labor statutes and regulations, would result in the same conclusion: that CAMPCO was 
engaged in prohibited activities of labor-only contracting. 
 
The existence of an independent and permissible contractor relationship is generally established by the 
following criteria: whether or not the contractor is carrying on an independent business; the nature and 
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extent of the work; the skill required; the term and duration of the relationship; the right to assign the 
performance of a specified piece of work; the control and supervision of the work to another; the 
employer's power with respect to the hiring, firing and payment of the contractor's workers; the control of 
the premises; the duty to supply the premises tools, appliances, materials and labor; and the mode, manner 
and terms of payment.[35] 
 
While there is present in the relationship of petitioner and CAMPCO some factors suggestive of an 
independent contractor relationship (i.e., CAMPCO chose who among its members should be sent to work 
for petitioner; petitioner paid CAMPCO the wages of the members, plus a percentage thereof as 
administrative charge; CAMPCO paid the wages of the members who rendered service to petitioner), many 
other factors are present which would indicate a labor-only contracting arrangement between petitioner and 
CAMPCO.[36] 
 
First, although petitioner touts the multi-million pesos assets of CAMPCO, it does well to remember that 
such were amassed in the years following its establishment. In 1993, when CAMPCO was established and 
the Service Contract between petitioner and CAMPCO was entered into, CAMPCO only had P6,600.00 
paid-up capital, which could hardly be considered substantial.[37] It only managed to increase its 
capitalization and assets in the succeeding years by continually and defiantly engaging in what had been 
declared by authorized DOLE officials as labor-only contracting. 
 
Second, CAMPCO did not carry out an independent business from petitioner. It was precisely established to
render services to petitioner to augment its workforce during peak seasons. Petitioner was its only client. 
Even as CAMPCO had its own office and office equipment, these were mainly used for administrative 
purposes; the tools, machineries, and equipment actually used by CAMPCO members when rendering 
services to the petitioner belonged to the latter. 
 
Third, petitioner exercised control over the CAMPCO members, including respondents. Petitioner attempts 
to refute control by alleging the presence of a CAMPCO supervisor in the work premises. Yet, the mere 
presence within the premises of a supervisor from the cooperative did not necessarily mean that CAMPCO 
had control over its members. Section 8(1), Rule VIII, Book III of the implementing rules of the Labor 
Code, as amended, required for permissible job contracting that the contractor undertakes the contract work 
on his account, under his own responsibility, according to his own manner and method, free from the 
control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work
except as to the results thereof. As alleged by the respondents, and unrebutted by petitioner, CAMPCO 
members, before working for the petitioner, had to undergo instructions and pass the training provided by 
petitioner's personnel. It was petitioner who determined and prepared the work assignments of the 
CAMPCO members. CAMPCO members worked within petitioner's plantation and processing plants 
alongside regular employees performing identical jobs, a circumstance recognized as an indicium of a 
labor-only contractorship.[38] 
 
Fourth, CAMPCO was not engaged to perform a specific and special job or service. In the Service Contract
of 1993, CAMPCO agreed to assist petitioner in its daily operations, and perform odd jobs as may be 
assigned. CAMPCO complied with this venture by assigning members to petitioner. Apart from that, no 
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other particular job, work or service was required from CAMPCO, and it is apparent, with such an 
arrangement, that CAMPCO merely acted as a recruitment agency for petitioner. Since the undertaking of 
CAMPCO did not involve the performance of a specific job, but rather the supply of manpower only, 
CAMPCO clearly conducted itself as a labor-only contractor.[39] 
 
Lastly, CAMPCO members, including respondents, performed activities directly related to the principal 
business of petitioner. They worked as can processing attendant, feeder of canned pineapple and pineapple 
processing, nata de coco processing attendant, fruit cocktail processing attendant, and etc., functions which 
were, not only directly related, but were very vital to petitioner's business of production and processing of 
pineapple products for export. 
 
The findings enumerated in the preceding paragraphs only support what DOLE Regional Director Parel and
DOLE Undersecretary Trajano had long before conclusively established, that CAMPCO was a mere labor-
only contractor. 
VI 
 
The declaration that CAMPCO is indeed engaged in the prohibited activities of labor-only contracting, then
consequently, an employer-employee relationship is deemed to exist between petitioner and respondents, 
since CAMPCO shall be considered as a mere agent or intermediary of petitioner. 
 
Since respondents are now recognized as employees of petitioner, this Court is tasked to determine the 
nature of their employment. In consideration of all the attendant circumstances in this case, this Court 
concludes that respondents are regular employees of petitioner. 
 
Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, reads â€“ 
ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. â€“ The provisions of written agreement to the contrary 
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be 
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary and 
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a 
specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of 
engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the 
employment is for the duration of the season. 
 
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if its is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, 
That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or 
broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his 
employment shall continue while such activity exists. 
This Court expounded on the afore-quoted provision, thus â€“ 
The primary standard, therefore, of determining a regular employment is the reasonable connection 
between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the 
employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of 
the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its 
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relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also, if the employee has been 
performing the job for at least one year, even if her performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, 
the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity 
if not indispensability of the activity to the business. Hence, the employment is also considered regular, but 
only with respect to such activity and while such activity exists.[40] 
In the instant Petition, petitioner is engaged in the manufacture and production of pineapple products for 
export. Respondents rendered services as processing attendant, feeder of canned pineapple and pineapple 
processing, nata de coco processing attendant, fruit cocktail processing attendant, and etc., functions they 
performed alongside regular employees of the petitioner. There is no doubt that the activities performed by 
respondents are necessary or desirable to the usual business of petitioner. 
 
Petitioner likewise want this Court to believe that respondents' employment was dependent on the peaks in 
operation, work backlogs, absenteeism, and excessive leaves. However, bearing in mind that respondents 
all claimed to have worked for petitioner for over a year, a claim which petitioner failed to rebut, then 
respondent's continued employment clearly demonstrates the continuing necessity and indispensability of 
respondents' employment to the business of petitioner. 
 
Neither can this Court apply herein the ruling of the NLRC in the previous case involving petitioner and the
individual workers they used to hire before the advent of the cooperatives, to the effect that the employment
of these individual workers were not regular, but rather, were valid "term employments," wherein the 
employer and employee knowingly and voluntarily agreed to employment for only a limited or specified 
period of time. The difference between that case and the one presently before this Court is that the members
of CAMPCO, including respondents, were not informed, at the time of their engagement, that their 
employment shall only be for a limited or specified period of time. There is absence of proof that the 
respondents were aware and had knowingly and voluntarily agreed to such term employment. Petitioner did
not enter into individual contracts with the CAMPCO members, but executed a Service Contract with 
CAMPCO alone. Although the Service Contract of 1993 stated that it shall be for a specific period, from 1 
July to 31 December 1993, petitioner and CAMPCO continued the service arrangement beyond 1993. Since
there was no written renewal of the Service Contract,[41] there was no further indication that the engagement
by petitioner of the services of CAMPCO members was for another definite or specified period only. 
 
Respondents, as regular employees of petitioner, are entitled to security of tenure. They could only be 
removed based on just and authorized causes as provided for in the Labor Code, as amended, and after they 
are accorded procedural due process. Therefore, petitioner's acts of placing some of the respondents on 
"stay home status" and not giving them work assignments for more than six months were already 
tantamount to constructive and illegal dismissal.[42] 
 
In summary, this Court finds that CAMPCO was a labor-only contractor and, thus, petitioner is the real 
employer of the respondents, with CAMPCO acting only as the agent or intermediary of petitioner. Due to 
the nature of their work and length of their service, respondents should be considered as regular employees 
of petitioner. Petitioner constructively dismissed a number of the respondents by placing them on "stay 
home status" for over six months, and was therefore guilty of illegal dismissal. Petitioner must accord 
respondents the status of regular employees, and reinstate the respondents who it constructively and 
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illegally dismissed, to their previous positions, without loss of seniority rights and other benefits, and pay 
these respondents' backwages from the date of filing of the Complaint with the NLRC on 19 December 
1996 up to actual reinstatement. 
 
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is DENIED and the Amended Decision, 
dated 27 November 2003, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63405 is AFFIRMED. 
 
Costs against the petitioner. 
 
SO ORDERED. 
 
Panganiban, C.J., (Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur. 
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